Publications of Mike Burkart

In a canonical takeover model we let informed large shareholders choose between making a bid and initiating a sale to another acquirer. Such takeover...

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 12 (1), 78–130

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 5 (2), 239–270.

We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects...

The Review of Economic Studies, 82 (3), 922–962.

Review of Finance, 19 (4), 1383–1414.

We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically...

In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of...

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to...

We examine whether a bidder can use tender o§er terms to signal post-takeover security benefits. Neither restricted bids nor cash-equity offers allow...

This paper analyzes how non-voting shares affect the takeover outcome in a single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benefit...

This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or...

It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert inputs than to divert cash. Suppliers, therefore, may lend more liberally than...

This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal...