Publications of Mike Burkart

Review of Financial Studies, 36 (5),1788–1836

Review of Financial Studies, 35 (4), 1868–1896

The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, 5 (2), 239–270.

We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects...

The Review of Economic Studies, 82 (3), 922–962.

Review of Finance, 19 (4), 1383–1414.

We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically...

In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of...

We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to...

We examine whether a bidder can use tender o§er terms to signal post-takeover security benefits. Neither restricted bids nor cash-equity offers allow...

This paper analyzes how non-voting shares affect the takeover outcome in a single-bidder model with asymmetric information and private benefit...

This paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or...

This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal...

We develop an incomplete contract model to analyze the enlargement strategy of a club. An applicant is characterized by his wealth and the degree of...

This paper studies block trades and tender offers as alternative means for transferring corporate control in firms with a dominant minority...

This paper provides an economist's guide to the regulation of public tender offers. It argues that the common interpretation of takeovers as solely...