Pension plan funding, risk sharing and technology choice
This paper presents a general equilibrium analysis on the interactions between pen- sion plan funding, capital structure, technology choice and the...
Long-term care insurance, annuities and asymmetric information: the case for bundling contracts
Within an asymmetric information set-up in which individuals differ in terms of their risk aversion and can choose whether or not to take preventative...
Incentive design under loss aversion
Compensation schemes often reward success but do not penalize failure. Fixed salaries with stock options or bonuses have this feature. Yet the...
Principal agent problems under loss aversion: an application to executive stock options
Executive stock options reward success but do not penalise failure. In contrast, the standard principal- agent model implies that pay is normally...
The near impossibility of credit rationing
Equilibrium credit rationing in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) implies the marginal cost of funds to the borrower is infinite. So borrowers...
The Reorganisation of the London Stock Market: The Causes and Consequences of Big-Bang
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