

Re-use of Collateral: Leverage, Volatility, and Welfare

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
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October 2019

Overview

- Collateral re-use is an important friction in financial markets
- The paper provides detailed background
- *Main objective:* to understand asset pricing and welfare implications
- *Key results:*
 - Re-use gives rise to higher leverage
 - Volatility decreases as re-use limits become tighter
 - Re-use limits can be welfare improving.

Model



- Infinite horizon economy with multiple states ω_k and rare disasters
- Two EZ investors with different risk aversions and beliefs π^h
 - Investor 2 is **pessimistic** and **more risk-averse** than investor 1
- Investors receive endowments proportional to aggregate endowment
- **Tradable assets**: riskless bond and a stock

Model (cont'd)

- Investors have limited liability, endowments cannot be pledged.
- Collateral constraint requires pledgeable financial wealth to be positive:

$$\underbrace{\phi^h(s^t)}_{\text{bond holding}} + \underbrace{\theta^h(s^t)(q(s^{t+1}) + d(s^{t+1}))}_{\text{stock holding payoff}} \geq 0 \quad (1)$$

- Naked short sales are prohibited, investors can re-use collateral
- Re-use of collateral restricts short-selling by risk averse pessimist:

$$\theta^h(s^t) \geq -\kappa \frac{\max\{0, -\phi^{-h}(s_t)\}}{\min_{s_{t+1}}\{q(s^{t+1}) + d(s^{t+1})\}} \quad (2)$$

- Short-sale constraint is a special case when $\kappa = 0$

Model (cont'd)

- Paper studies asset pricing implications and the welfare effects.
- Investor 1 borrows from 2 using stocks as collateral
- Investor 2 shorts collateral, subject to re-use constraint
- Mechanism is as follows:
 - Decreasing κ restricts short-selling;
 - Leverage also goes down;
 - Risk-sharing and trading is restricted;
 - Volatility decreases as a result.

Model (cont'd)

- *Compensated gains*: compensate agent 1 by transfer to/from agent 2.
- Transfer is such that welfare of investor 1 the same as before the change.
- Welfare assessed under various convex combinations of beliefs.
- *Key result*: there is optimal level of re-use that balances two effects.
 - Higher κ improves risk-sharing.
 - Lower κ discourages speculation.

Comments

- Maybe, further clarify “collateral constraint” vs “re-use”
- Collateral constraint also restricts both short-selling and leverage
 - It requires to collateralize any short positions with tradable bonds
 - Why shouldn't investors be allowed to collateralize using bonds?
 - Why should they “re-use” stock collateral instead?
- Reason seems to be that
 - Repo loan cannot be used as collateral \Rightarrow re-use needed to short
 - Paper uses repo as an example where re-use may arise
- Maybe, say explicitly that long “bond” cannot be used as collateral
 - Constraint (1) mainly needed to restrict investor 1's borrowing
 - But (1) with $\phi^h > 0$ seems redundant for investor 2 given (2)

Comments (cont'd)

- Other constraints also restrict leverage (e.g., borrowing, margin)
- Similar to tighter re-use, these constraints
 - Can restrict leverage and decrease volatility
 - The same welfare intuition goes through as well
- Short-sales also decrease volatility because of restricted risk-sharing
- Would be interesting to compare the qualitative effects
 - Quantitative effect of $\kappa = 0.2$ vs $\kappa = 0$ (short-sale constraint) small
- Any sense about short-sale with “re-use” as % of all short-sales?


Comments (cont'd)

- Is re-use regulation primarily needed to limit speculations or contagions?
- Qualitative effects might be different with many trees and agents:
 - Agent i may borrow from agent j to buy tree k using tree m as collateral
 - Or, agent i may short some trees, long others, and lend, etc.
 - Their positions/re-uses will define a network.
 - Endogenous re-use networks may arise
- This might be an interesting extension with new effects
 - E.g., bad shock to one asset affects its collateral value
 - This asset becomes worse collateral for shorting other assets
 - Values of other assets are affected as a result \Rightarrow market volatility unclear
- Authors seem to have methodology to study this

Comments (cont'd)

- Paper studies simulated stats for interest rates, volatilities, Sharpe ratios
- Why not plot them as functions of wealth share (as prices and holdings)?
- Conditional effects are also important:
 - Are volatilities etc. higher/lower in states where constraints are tight?
 - Pro-/counter- cyclical of equilibrium processes?
 - Simulated plots also might be useful to, e.g., spot clustering of volatilities
- Is there excess volatility (relative to dividend volatility)?

Comments (cont'd)



- Welfare analysis is a nice application of Brunnermeier et al (2014)
- Welfare transfers should be better explained
- There seem to be welfare gains if transfers are allowed
 - How to implement transfers in practice?

Comments (cont'd)

- Paper disentangles effects of speculation and risk-sharing on welfare
- One calibration has identical beliefs but different risk-aversions
 - Why are they shorting if beliefs are the same?
 - Might be because endowment perfectly correlated with dividends
 - Then, investors may short to decrease total holding of the tree
 - If so, this should be explained
 - How large are short positions?
- Also, why is the plot for agent 1 on Figure XI hump-shaped?
 - There is no speculation, so previous intuition does not seem to apply
 - Shouldn't loose re-use improve risk sharing for both investors?

Comments (cont'd)

- Change in re-use affects welfare via two channels
 - Direct effect: change in risk-sharing opportunities
 - Indirect effect: change in prices in equilibrium
- Might be interesting to disentangle these effects
- Might explain welfare non-monotonicity when both have correct beliefs
- The paper studies welfare assuming median wealth share
 - How about unconditional welfare at time $t = -1$?
 - Consider value functions averaged across states and ergodic distribution.

Conclusion

- Interesting and well-written paper
- Studies an important friction and its effects on welfare and prices
- Some extensions may generate further interesting effects.