

DE-RISKING THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

REFORMING THE MACROFINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE

Who holds European sovereign debt: a distributional analysis

Wednesday 11 September 2019

#deriskingEU **y** #deepeningEMU

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# From tax state to 'debt state' But who is behind the 'debt state'?

- > Background: Post-WW2 state expenditures high due strong welfare state but neoliberal reforms → taxes replaced by public debt (Streeck, 2014)
- > Governments structurally dependent on financial markets for refinancing
- > Creditors vs. citizens:
  - > Citizens: demand public services
  - > Creditors: demand interest service (e.g. 10% of total expenditure in IT)
- > So who are the creditors? The rich?















### Sectoral ownership of government bonds (% of total)

Pre-€ - pre-crisis - today



Source: Bruegel

# Disaggregating Italy's holding structure Residents



Source: OECD Institutional Investors' Assets & Liabilities















Disaggregating Italy's holding structure



### Which households hold Italian public debt?

Households' various forms of savings (share held by wealth brackets)



Source: Banca d'Italia Household panel data















Disaggregating Italy's holding structure



#### Cui bono?

## Looking at the shareholders of biggest creditors



# Distributional effects of public debt: regressive? No and yes!

- Ownership ≠ overall distributional effect → depends on use of money
- Significant beneficiary is governm. itself
- Ownership and beneficiary structure biased in favor of financial institutions, the wealthy & other financial institutions
- Public debt gives them "safe asset" to store value and to trade with
- A new (financial) rentier class?













### Can we change this?

- Distribute government bonds more equally >> break structural power of finance?
- If wealth is unequally distributed, so will government bonds be
- BUT doom loop has upsides in times of crisis (ECB, 2018)
- Let central banks continue (non-inflationary) monetary financing past 30% rule or at least proper financial repression (e.g. enforce low interest rates)
















For full data sources and methodology → MPIfG Discussion paper coming out in October; will be shared on ✓ @tobyarbo

FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN PROGRESSIVE STUDIES

# Disaggregating Italy's holding structure

### **Residents:** banks



Source: EBA Stress test














## Marketization of public debt

Italian public debt: share of debt securities (i.e. marketization)



Gross general government debt (right axis) — Share marketable debt (left axis)











