Discussion of

Cross-Market Timing in Security Issuance Pengjie Gao and Dong Lou

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Summary

- Two views of corporate finance in the face of dysfunctional markets.
 - Corporations may act as arbitrageurs.
 - Non-fundamental price shocks may loosen financial constraints.
- This paper argues that both are true, but for different firms.
 - Financially unconstrained firms act as arbitrageurs.
 - Financially constrained firms use positive shocks to asset prices as an opportunity to raise capital and finance investment.
- Implications for leverage when equity is overvalued.
 - Decreases for unconstrained firms, which just issue equity.
 - Constant for constrained firms, which issue debt and equity.

Summary

- Paper documents a very specific version of the broader view.
- Flow Induced Price Pressure (FIPP)
 - When mutual funds receive outflows, they liquidate positions.
 - When they receive inflows, they expand pre-existing positions.
 - If flows are correlated among funds holding a particular stock, they may all be liquidating/expanding their positions at the same time → Price Pressure.
- Use FIPP as a measure of mispricing.
 - It forecasts both equity and debt returns.
- Use KZ as a measure of financial constraints.

General Comments

- Nice paper on an interesting subject.
 - Pulls together lots of interesting data sources.
- Nice empirical idea for isolating equity overvaluation.
- Main suggestions:
 - Flesh out the story a bit more.
 - Start with simpler empirics.
 - More discussion of magnitudes.
 - More discussion of main conditioning variables, FIPP and KZ.

Fleshing Out the Hypothesis

- Most intuitive version thinks about equity mispricing with a constant leverage constraint (but no explicit debt mispricing).
 - This is the case consider by Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003).

- When equity is overvalued:
 - Unconstrained firms issue equity and hold as cash (investment is already first best).
 - Constrained firms issue both debt and equity (because leverage constraint is loosened) and invest the proceeds.

Fleshing Out the Hypothesis

- When equity is undervalued:
 - Unconstrained firms should repurchase.
 - Seems unlikely that constrained firms would do the same but depends on magnitude of mispricing.

- What happens when debt is mispriced as well?
 - Debt mispricing positively correlated with equity mispricing.
 - So debt issuance becomes more attractive for unconstrained firms at the same time equity issuance does.
 - And becomes less attractive for unconstrained firms when equity repurchases are attractive.

Starting with the Raw Data

- Authors immediately jump to using FIPP as an explanatory variable.
- Would be nice to first see the pattern in the raw data.
 - Are debt and equity issuance more correlated for financially constrained firms than unconstrained ones?
 - Is leverage more sensitive to Q or M/B for unconstrained firms?
 - Could further examine sensitivities to aggregate versus firmspecific Q or M/B as in Lamont and Stein (2006).
 - Debt-Equity market segmentation: Time series correlation of credit spreads and Q or M/B.
- Longer time series and easier comparison to prior work.

Magnitudes: Prices

- Size of the predictability in stocks:
 - Standard asset pricing approach: form decile portfolios.
 - 10-1 FIPP portfolio generates -8.40% alpha over two years.
 - But from issuer perspective 10-5 returns might be more meaningful
 → something like -2.1% per year.
 - Doesn't seem huge but...
- What is the right comparison?
 - Net Share issuance anomaly?
 - Estimated costs of external finance?
 - Underwriting fees
 - Hennessy-Whited (2007)
 - Benefits of debt/capital structure optimization?
 - Graham (2000), Korteweg (2010)

Magnitudes: Prices

- Size of the predictability in bonds:
 - Panel approach: regress changes in credit spreads on FIPP.
 - 1 stdev higher FIPP = 22 bps rise in yields over 2 years = -0.6% return per year.
 - Can use this number to think about issuer incentives, but hard to compare to equity predictability
 - Guess 10 5 portfolio = median to 90th percentile = 1.5 stdevs?
 - Back of the envelope predictability twice as strong (2% per year) in equities as in bonds (1% per year).
- Suggestions
 - Treat debt and equity symmetrically so that effects can be compared

Magnitudes: Issuance/Capital Structure

- Size of the issuance effect in bonds:
 - 1 stdev higher FIPP = +26 bps net debt issuance for constrained firms.
 - 1 stdev higher FIPP = -14 bps net debt issuance for unconstrained.
 - Average net debt issuance is 3.2% and stdev is 17.6%.
- Size of the leverage effect is similarly small
 - 1 stdev higher FIPP = 6.9 bps lower leverage for unconstrained firms.
 - No effect for constrained.
 - Average leverage is 25%.

Magnitudes: Issuance/Capital Structure

- In contrast, 1 stdev of Baker-Wurgler (2002) market timing variable = 6-10% effect on leverage.
- What's the difference? A few possibilities:
 - FIPP may be better in terms of identification, but doesn't generate much variation in returns.
 - Lumpiness in issuance is somehow dampening the results.
 - Baker-Wurgler pick up the effects of repeated market timing.
 - But seems like you'd need a large number of episodes to aggregate up to their numbers.

FIPP

- Using anomaly variables to measure mispricing is a nice improvement on previous approaches.
- What about other anomalies?
 - Think of issuance as aggregating mispricing signals.
 - Identification tradeoff
 is FIPP more plausibly exogenous than other anomalies?
- Continuation and reversal?
 - Effect of FIPP was positive, then negative in Lou (2011)
 - Seems to be just negative in this paper.
- Somewhat worrisome that forecasts debt returns?
 - Cleanest version: high returns for stock A \rightarrow flows for fund F \rightarrow high returns for stock B \rightarrow B issues equity.

FIPP

- Strategy alpha reflects either mispricing or risk.
 - Paper is written largely with a mispricing perspective.
- Suppose FIPP captures some rational risk factor.
 - High FIPP indicates lower required returns.
- Could explain capital structure results.
 - Lower returns alter trade-off differently for constrained and unconstrained firms.
- Seems harder to generate investment results.
 - To a first order, lower required returns should induce more investment from all firms.
 - But there are more complicated rational explanations...

- Many measures of financial constraints.
 - KZ is a bit of a black-box.
 - Relatedly, spelling out exactly what is meant by financial constraints might be helpful.
 - External dependence
 - Cost wedge between internal and external funds
- Might try some others.
 - Rajan-Zingales (1998) external finance dependence → nice because it can be measured at the industry level.
 - Whited-Wu (2006).
 - Cash flow sensitivity of cash.

	Net CF from Financing	
FIPP	0.0393***	0.0122
	(0.0098)	(0.0133)
FIPP x Median Dependence		0.0176
		(0.0173)
FIPP x High Dependence		0.0553
		(0.0240)
Median Dependence		0.0236***
		(0.00313)
High Dependence		0.0671***
		(0.0048)

• More financially constrained firms are raising more total financing.

Additional Comments

- Split all analyses by KZ.
- Summary stats
 - Ensure that variation in FIPP is similar for constrained and unconstrained.
- Equity return forecasting regressions
 - Make sure there is the same in scope for market timing.
- Debt return and rating forecasting regressions
 - Same scope for timing.
 - Are these driven by changes in asset prices or changes in firm capital structure? → examine subsample w/o debt issues.
 - To the extent that unconstrained firms are arbitrageurs, should predictability be weaker for them? (No effect for IG debt)

Minor Additional Comments

- Clustering
 - Panel regressions cluster by firm.
 - May want to cluster by firm and time (Thompson (2010)).
 - Possibly even correct for persistence (Driscoll and Kraay (1998)).
- Sample sizes move around within some tables.
- Some numbers in the text don't seem to match the tables.

Conclusion

- Nice paper on an interesting subject.
- Encourage the authors to flesh out the hypothesis a bit more and think more about the magnitudes.
- Thanks!