


FEMALE EMPLOYMENT AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM SYRIAN REFUGEE INFLOWS TO TURKEY

Bilge Erten, Northeastern University and IZA
Pinar Keskin, Wellesley College

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VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: PREVALENCE

1 in 3 women throughout the world will experience physical and/or sexual violence by a partner or sexual violence by a non-partner



All statistics can be found in the report entitled Global and regional estimates of violence against women: Prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence, by the World Health Organization, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, and the South African Medical Research Council, found here: <http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/en/index.html>

- Women in violent relationships are more likely to report:
 - mental health problems,
 - suicidal thoughts and attempts,
 - alcohol and substance abuse,
 - absence from work,
 - sexually transmitted diseases and unintended pregnancies (Campbell 2002).
- Children born or raised in such households are more likely to have:
 - lower birth weights (Aizer 2010),
 - difficulty in relating with their peers (Carlson 2000),
 - delays in neuro-cognitive development (Huth-Bocks et al. 2001)
 - lower IQ (Koenen et al. 2003).
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EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

- Empowerment of women is often thought of as a major tool in the fight against intimate partner violence.
- However, the impact of female economic empowerment on the level of domestic violence is *a priori* ambiguous.
 - Bargaining Theories: Female empowerment may increase the resources available to women within the household; improve their outside options and/or bargaining status in their relationships; and decrease their exposure to violence (Farmer and Tiefenthaler 1996; Stevenson and Wolfers 2006; Aizer 2010; Hidrobo and Fernald 2013, Anderberg et al. 2015).
 - Instrumental Violence Theories: An increase in the resources available to women may strengthen the incentives of men to use violence or threats of violence in order to control these newly obtained resources or to regain decision-making power within the household (Bloch and Rao 2002; Eswaran and Malhotra 2011; Bobonis et al. 2013, Erten and Keskin 2018).

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OUR STUDY: EMPLOYMENT AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

- Employment is one of the most effective ways to empower women.
- A body of empirical work in the literature documents a negative correlation between domestic violence and women's employment.
 - Several of these studies do not account for reverse causality or omitted variable bias, and they focus on documenting a descriptive relationship (Tauchen et al. 1991; Vyas and Watts 2009; Heath 2014).
 - Most relevant to our study, Aizer (2010) in the US and Anderberg et al. (2015) in the UK investigate the effects of the relative labor market conditions of women on domestic violence and find strong evidence in support of bargaining theories.
 - Our main contribution is that we investigate the effects of a supply shock to female employment on domestic violence in a developing country context with low levels of female labor force participation and a high prevalence of domestic violence.

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- We examine whether an exogenous change in the employment opportunities for women has an impact on the probability of experiencing domestic violence.
- In particular, we exploit the differential arrivals of Syrian refugees across subregions of Turkey as an exogenous supply shock to female employment.
 - The war in Syria has resulted in 6.3 million refugees, 3.4 millions of which fled to Turkey.
 - The Syrian refugee influx to Turkey is expected to differentially displace Turkish workers by gender (Del Carpio and Wagner 2016, Aksu et al. 2018).
 - The Syrian refugees in Turkey are overwhelmingly employed informally since they were not issued work permits until 2016 (Meyers 2017).
 - Women have been disproportionately employed in informal work since the arrival of informality in the Turkish economy, such as agriculture and domestic services (Del Carpio 2016).

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OUR STUDY: EMPLOYMENT AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

- We use an instrumental variables strategy to account for the potential endogeneity of refugee inflows into Turkish provinces.
- Our preferred instrument relies on using travel distance between 13 origin governorates in Syria and 81 Turkish provinces (1053 origin-destination pairs).
 - Alternative estimates using a language-based instrument provide very similar results.
 - Our results are also robust to excluding three provinces that received the highest Syrian refugee inflows as a share of their population, as well as excluding the three most populous and economically active provinces with the largest labor markets.
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PREVIEW OF OUR FINDINGS

- We find that the Syrian refugee inflows had a negative impact on the labor market outcomes of women.
- In contrast, we find no evidence of a significant impact for male labor market outcomes.
- Our findings also reveal a significant decline in intimate partner violence in the provinces that received a higher share of Syrian refugees.
- Our results are consistent with instrumental theories of violence, whereby a decline in a woman's earning opportunities reduces incentives of her male partner to use violence as a means of extracting rents from her.
- Examining alternative channels, we are able to rule out other potential explanations, including changes in partner characteristics, gender attitudes, cohabitation patterns, or the division of labor within the household.

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
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- **Background and the context**
- Data
- Empirical strategy
- Primary results
- Alternative channels
- Conclusion


BACKGROUND: SYRIAN REFUGEE INFLOWS TO TURKEY

- The war in Syria began in March 2011 with the violent response of the Basher Al-Assad regime to peaceful civil protests.
- The violent conflict spread across Syria and displaced 12.5 million individuals by 2017. Out of 6.3 million Syrian refugees, 3.4 million resettled in Turkey (UNHCR 2017).



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BACKGROUND: TEMPORARY PROTECTION REGIME

- The Turkish government responded to the early waves of refugee inflows by enacting a Temporary Protection Regime in October 2011.
 - The refugees were assured no forced return, which implied that they did not have to use illegal means to cross the border.
 - This policy also guaranteed a range of rights and services: access to education, health services and social assistance, and freedom of movement within Turkey.
 - However, temporary protection status did not provide them work authorization until January 2016, as a result of which most Syrians have been working in the informal sector.
- As the refugee camps' capacity was quickly exceeded, 85% of refugees were living outside of camps across different regions of Turkey by the end of 2014 (Erdogan 2014).

Location of refugee camps

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
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Location of refugee camps

SHARE OF SYRIAN REFUGEES IN TURKISH POPULATION (IN %), 2014



- Background and the context
- **Data**
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We use two main sources of data for refugee inflows:

- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) publishes data on the total number of Syrian refugee inflows into Turkey on an annual basis from 2010 to 2017.
- The Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), the Turkish migration authority, provides data on the number of registered Syrian refugees in each province.
- Since refugees may have migrated into other provinces after registration, there is likely to be measurement error in the number of refugees in a given province.

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 - Nationally representative household surveys, targeted women between 15 and 59 years old.
 - One woman is randomly selected from each household to answer a series of questions regarding her experiences with physical, sexual, and psychological domestic violence.
 - These questions provide information on whether violence occurred in the past 12 months.
 - Surveys also include questions on demographics, labor market outcomes, partner characteristics and marriage market outcomes, and gender attitudes.
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SUMMARY STATISTICS

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	N
Panel A: Female demographics and employment outcomes					
Years of schooling	6.57	3.85	0.00	21.00	13435
Non-Turkish speaker	0.01	0.11	0.00	1.00	13422
Lives in a rural area	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00	13440
Age	37.05	10.41	15.00	60.00	13440
Has a personal income	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00	13440
Worked last week	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00	13438
Public employment	0.03	0.17	0.00	1.00	13440
Private employment	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00	13440
Agricultural employment	0.05	0.21	0.00	1.00	13440
Industrial employment	0.02	0.13	0.00	1.00	13440
Service employment	0.11	0.31	0.00	1.00	13440
Forced to drop out of labor market by husband	0.10	0.30	0.00	1.00	13421
Panel B: Male employment outcomes					
Worked last week	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00	13433
Public employment	0.11	0.32	0.00	1.00	13433
Private employment	0.66	0.48	0.00	1.00	13433
Agricultural employment	0.06	0.25	0.00	1.00	13433
Industrial employment	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00	13433
Service employment	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00	13433

SUMMARY STATISTICS (CONT'D)

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max	N
Panel C: Domestic violence outcomes					
Physical violence index	0.00	0.80	-0.31	5.45	13435
Sexual violence index	-0.01	0.76	-0.22	6.79	13436
Psychological violence index	0.02	0.81	-0.42	2.62	13437
Panel D: Gender attitudes outcomes					
A woman should not argue with her partner if she disagrees with him.	0.44	0.50	0.00	1.00	13351
Men can beat their partners in certain situations.	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00	13115
A woman should be able to spend her money as she wills.	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00	13301
It may be necessary to beat children for discipline.	0.30	0.46	0.00	1.00	13393
Panel E: Marriage market outcomes					
Husband had a second wife	0.01	0.09	0.00	1.00	13439
Husband has a second wife	0.00	0.06	0.00	1.00	13440
Husband's schooling	8.24	3.65	0.00	22.00	13145
Husband's age	40.04	10.72	16.00	95.00	13351
Husband's religiosity index	0.03	0.49	-7.44	0.52	13440
Marriage decision	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00	13435
Panel F: Co-residence outcomes					
Cohabiting with parent in-laws	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00	13440
Cohabiting with any parent	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00	13440

- Background and the context
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- We compare individual outcomes in locations that are exposed to larger refugee inflows with individual outcomes in locations that are less exposed to such inflows before and after the war in Syria began.
- The resettlement of refugees is a potentially endogenous decision.
- There might also be measurement error in the province-level refugee inflows, which would bias the OLS estimates downward.
- To address these issues, we use an instrumental variables approach following previous literature (Card 2001, Del Carpio and Wagner 2016, Altindag et al. 2018).

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- We estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{ipt} = \beta(R/Pop)_{pt} + \gamma X_{ipt} + \sigma Z_{pt} + \delta_p + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ipt},$$

- Y_{ipt} : Outcome for individual i in province p in year t
 - $(R/Pop)_{pt}$: Refugees as a share of province population in year t
 - X_{ipt} : Individual-level controls (including education, age, type of location, and mother tongue)
 - Z_{pt} : Province-level time-varying controls (including trade volume of each province with Syria)
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- Following Del Carpio and Wagner (2016), our instrument relies on the fact that travel distance, from the Syrian governorates from which refugees depart to each province in Turkey where they settle, is an important predictor of where the refugees settle.
- The instrument for the refugee inflows at any point in time for each province in Turkey is calculated as follows:

$$IV_{pt} = \sum_s \frac{1}{\tau_{sp}} \pi_s R_t,$$

where τ_{sp} is the travel distance from each Syrian governorate s to a Turkish province p , π_s is the share of Syrian population in each governorate s in 2011 (pre-war), and R_t is the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey in year t .

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FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS

	Dependent variable: Share of refugees in province population		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Distance instrument	0.012*** (0.01)	0.013*** (0.01)	0.013*** (0.01)
F-statistic	77.15	107.83	70.90
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x
Individual characteristics	x	x	x
Log trade volume		x	x
Baseline trade interacted with time			x

Using a language instrument

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Female labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.831*** (0.219)	-0.861*** (0.254)	-0.845*** (0.211)	-0.734*** (0.137)	-0.725*** (0.173)	-0.670*** (0.116)	0.18
Observations	13,415	13,415	13,415	13,415	13,415	13,415	
Has personal income	-0.674*** (0.229)	-0.674*** (0.229)	-0.682*** (0.233)	-0.606*** (0.230)	-0.606*** (0.230)	-0.567*** (0.204)	0.12
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Panel B: Male labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.086 (0.149)	0.039 (0.315)	0.030 (0.311)	-0.221 (0.231)	-0.172 (0.332)	-0.075 (0.409)	0.77
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

- A one standard deviation increase in refugee share results in a 1.4 percentage point decline in female employment, corresponding to a 8% decline relative to the mean.

Relationship status

Reduced-form

Language instrument

Excluding Hatay, Kilis, and Sanliurfa

Excluding Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir

By sector

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Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

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EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON PROBABILITY OF BEING FORCED TO DROP OF THE LABOR MARKET BY HUSBAND

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Forced to drop out of labor market	-0.009 (0.258)	-0.009 (0.258)	0.010 (0.282)	0.259 (0.312)	0.262 (0.296)	0.181 (0.247)	0.24
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Forced to drop out of labor market in the last 12 months	0.004 (0.134)	-0.001 (0.131)	-0.006 (0.125)	0.004 (0.129)	-0.018 (0.113)	0.005 (0.097)	0.10
Observations	13,398	13,398	13,398	13,398	13,398	13,398	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES USING HLFS DATA

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Female labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.301 (0.337)	-0.500 (0.314)	-0.576 (0.339)	-0.521* (0.269)	-0.909*** (0.234)	-0.790*** (0.236)	0.22
Observations	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	
Log monthly earnings	-2.310*** (0.400)	-1.968*** (0.450)	-2.257*** (0.798)	-3.429*** (0.679)	-2.938*** (0.433)	-2.484*** (0.433)	0.58
Observations	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	
Hours worked	-15.789 (11.881)	-21.640* (11.683)	-25.949* (12.811)	-27.872*** (9.911)	-39.935*** (11.429)	-33.168*** (10.532)	9.01
Observations	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	225,038	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES USING HLFS DATA

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel B: Male labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	0.275 (0.183)	0.165 (0.149)	0.150 (0.153)	0.266 (0.183)	0.064 (0.135)	0.089 (0.127)	0.76
Observations	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	
Log monthly earnings	-0.546 (1.050)	-1.227 (0.773)	-1.308* (0.721)	-0.141 (1.199)	-1.342 (0.822)	-1.217 (0.834)	3.05
Observations	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	
Hours worked	17.154 (12.678)	11.566 (11.907)	11.503 (12.189)	18.130 (11.806)	8.009 (10.709)	8.191 (10.191)	40.61
Observations	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	207,149	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

- Following Duflo et al. (2007) and Kling et al. (2007), we aggregate information from each set of domestic violence measures for the last 12 months by averaging z-scores of each underlying indicator.
 - Physical violence index: slap or throw an object that would hurt; push, shove, or pull hair; hit with his fist or in a way that hurts; kick, pull on the ground, or beat; choke or burn
 - Sexual violence index: forced sexual acts; forced sex due to fear; humiliated sexual acts
 - Psychological violence index: insult; humiliate; threaten or scare
- This aggregation approach provides greater statistical power to identify effects in the same direction for a group of indicators that capture similar forms of violent behavior.
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EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OUTCOMES

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Physical violence index	-1.571*** (0.578)	-1.518*** (0.495)	-1.590*** (0.592)	-2.025*** (0.741)	-1.812*** (0.611)	-1.804** (0.704)	0.00
Observations	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	
Sexual violence index	-1.420*** (0.319)	-1.365*** (0.330)	-1.473*** (0.323)	-2.165*** (0.596)	-1.951*** (0.503)	-1.554*** (0.367)	-0.01
Observations	13,413	13,413	13,413	13,413	13,413	13,413	
Psychological violence index	-1.332** (0.551)	-1.262** (0.592)	-1.409** (0.537)	-2.562*** (0.908)	-2.581*** (0.818)	-2.197*** (0.690)	0.02
Observations	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

- A one standard deviation increase in refugee share results in a 4 ppt decline in physical violence index.

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OUTCOMES

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
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Observations	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

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HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS BY EDUCATION LEVEL

	Middle school or less (≤ 8 years of schooling)			More than middle school (> 8 years of schooling)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Worked last week	-0.914*** (0.216)	-1.073*** (0.317)	-0.924*** (0.283)	-1.027 (0.632)	-1.055* (0.620)	-0.943 (0.623)
Observations	10,121	10,121	10,121	3,299	3,299	3,299
Has personal income	-0.610*** (0.181)	-0.610*** (0.193)	-0.551*** (0.170)	-1.006 (0.783)	-0.989 (0.729)	-0.930 (0.734)
Observations	10,122	10,122	10,122	3,300	3,300	3,300
Husband worked last week	-0.315 (0.363)	-0.371 (0.348)	-0.132 (0.288)	-0.012 (0.737)	-0.094 (0.710)	0.186 (0.743)
Observations	10,117	10,117	10,117	3,298	3,298	3,298
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x

HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS BY EDUCATION LEVEL

	Middle school or less (≤ 8 years of schooling)			More than middle school (> 8 years of schooling)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Physical violence index	-2.454*** (0.780)	-2.281*** (0.706)	-2.155*** (0.725)	-0.497 (1.076)	-0.193 (0.841)	-0.162 (0.777)
Observations	10,117	10,117	10,117	3,300	3,300	3,300
Sexual violence index	-2.092*** (0.724)	-1.865*** (0.589)	-1.474*** (0.343)	-2.330** (1.119)	-2.193* (1.173)	-1.705 (1.268)
Observations	10,119	10,119	10,119	3,299	3,299	3,299
Psychological violence index	-2.906*** (0.813)	-2.709*** (0.750)	-2.170*** (0.534)	-1.022 (1.914)	-0.576 (1.652)	0.517 (1.123)
Observations	10,120	10,120	10,120	3,299	3,299	3,299
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x

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REFUGEES AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS AND PRE-TRENDS

- 1 **Attitudes channel:** Refugees may have different gender attitudes than natives, and increased cultural contact may result in a greater diffusion of these attitudes. [Results](#)
- 2 **Marriage market channel:** The entry of refugees as potential partners in the marriage market can result in changes in assortative matching. It can also increase possibility of having a second wife. [Results](#)
- 3 **Cohabitation channel:** Refugee inflows are expected to affect the rental market as most of the refugees residing outside of the camps primarily seek affordable rental accommodation rather than home ownership. [Results](#)
- 4 **Division of labor within the household channel:** The displaced women may now have more time to do housework, which may in turn make men more satisfied with their marriages and reduce their violent behaviors toward women. [Results](#)
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CONCLUSION

- We exploit the differential inflow of Syrian refugees across Turkish provinces following the outbreak of Syrian civil war in 2011 as an exogenous supply shock to female employment.
- We find that the Syrian refugee inflows negatively affected the labor market outcomes of women, with no evidence of a significant impact on male labor market outcomes.
- Our findings also reveal a significant decline in exposure to intimate partner violence in provinces that received a higher share of Syrian refugees.
- In an examination of alternative channels, we find no evidence of a significant impact of refugee inflows on partner characteristics, gender attitudes, co-residence patterns, or the division of labor within the household.
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GENDER AND INFORMALITY IN THE TURKISH ECONOMY


Industry Distribution and Informality by Gender for Private Sector Paid Employment in 2011 (in %)

	Male		Female	
	(1) Industry Share	(2) Share Informal	(3) Industry Share	(4) Share Informal
Agriculture	17.3	67.5	18.4	95.5
Mining	0.7	11	0.1	0
Manufacturing (food, leather, textile)	14.6	26.7	22.2	48
Other manufacturing	9.6	9.8	5	10.5
Construction	11.7	53.5	1.4	13
Wholesale retail	18	33	15.7	29.6
Transportation	5.3	44.4	0.6	18.9
Accommodation, food, and beverages	6.3	41.3	4.7	35.2
Education	0.8	18	3.3	13.6
Household work	0.2	35.5	6.1	92.7
Other services	15.5	24.3	22.5	20.6

Notes: Data from 2011 HLFS. *Industry Share* reports the distribution of employees across industries. *Share Informal* reports the fraction of employees in each industry who are employed informally.


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NUMBER OF SYRIAN REFUGEES



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SYRIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN TURKEY (SOURCE: UNHCR)



EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON RELATIONSHIP STATUS

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ever had a relationship	0.181 (0.123)	0.187 (0.127)	0.201 (0.134)	0.270 (0.245)	0.309 (0.246)	0.247 (0.200)	0.90
Observations	17,392	17,392	17,392	17,392	17,392	17,392	
Ever married	-0.021 (0.198)	-0.013 (0.212)	-0.012 (0.213)	0.009 (0.290)	0.056 (0.312)	0.051 (0.296)	0.81
Observations	17,393	17,393	17,393	17,393	17,393	17,393	
Currently married	0.252 (0.272)	0.248 (0.266)	0.242 (0.263)	0.292 (0.354)	0.267 (0.349)	0.291 (0.347)	0.75
Observations	17,392	17,392	17,392	17,392	17,392	17,392	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	


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- An alternative instrument uses variation in the pre-war share of Arabic speakers in province population to predict where refugees are more likely to resettle (Altindag and Kaushal 2017).
- This language instrument can be calculated as follows:

$$IV_{pt}^{language} = (A/Pop)_{p,1965} R_t,$$

where $(A/Pop)_{p,1965}$ is the share of Arabic speakers in province population in 1965, and R_t is the number of registered Syrian refugees in Turkey in year t .

SHARE OF ARABIC SPEAKERS IN TURKISH POPULATION (IN %), 1965



FIRST-STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS: LANGUAGE INSTRUMENT

	Dependent variable: Share of refugees in province population		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Language instrument	0.00028*** (0.000)	0.00028*** (0.000)	0.00029*** (0.000)
F-statistic	70.78	71.71	71.02
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x
Individual characteristics	x	x	x
Log trade volume		x	x
Baseline trade interacted with time			x

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EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES: USING A LANGUAGE IV

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Female labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.831*** (0.219)	-0.861*** (0.254)	-0.901*** (0.274)	-0.734*** (0.137)	-0.725*** (0.173)	-0.625*** (0.139)	0.18
Observations	13,415	13,415	13,415	13,415	13,415	13,415	
Has personal income	-0.674*** (0.229)	-0.674*** (0.229)	-0.693*** (0.246)	-0.606*** (0.230)	-0.606*** (0.230)	-0.559*** (0.213)	0.12
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Panel B: Male labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.086 (0.149)	0.039 (0.315)	-0.015 (0.290)	-0.221 (0.231)	-0.172 (0.332)	-0.040 (0.359)	0.77
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Panel C: Being forced to drop out of the labor market by the husband							
Forced to drop out of labor market	-0.009 (0.258)	-0.009 (0.258)	0.010 (0.282)	-0.009 (0.232)	-0.009 (0.232)	-0.057 (0.225)	0.24
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Forced to drop out of labor market in the last 12 months	0.004 (0.134)	-0.001 (0.131)	-0.006 (0.125)	-0.150 (0.135)	-0.148 (0.144)	-0.133 (0.137)	0.10
Observations	13,398	13,398	13,398	13,398	13,398	13,398	

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OUTCOMES USING A LANGUAGE INSTRUMENT

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Physical violence index	-1.571*** (0.578)	-1.518*** (0.495)	-1.542*** (0.520)	-1.359** (0.635)	-1.375** (0.541)	-1.312** (0.522)	0.00
Observations	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	
Sexual violence index	-1.420*** (0.319)	-1.365*** (0.330)	-1.463*** (0.315)	-1.973*** (0.340)	-1.988*** (0.284)	-1.734*** (0.245)	-0.01
Observations	13,413	13,413	13,413	13,413	13,413	13,413	
Psychological violence index	-1.332** (0.551)	-1.262** (0.592)	-1.411** (0.543)	-2.562*** (0.908)	-2.581*** (0.818)	-2.192*** (0.694)	0.02
Observations	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	13,414	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

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REDUCED-FORM EFFECTS ON LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Female labor market outcomes			
Worked last week	-0.013*** (0.003)	-0.015*** (0.004)	-0.014*** (0.004)
Observations	13,415	13,415	13,415
Has personal income	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.003)	-0.010*** (0.004)
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417
Panel B: Male labor market outcomes			
Worked last week	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)
Observations	13,410	13,410	13,410
Panel C: Being forced to drop out of the labor market by the husband			
Forced to drop out of labor market	0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417
Forced to drop out of labor market in the last 12 months	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Observations	13,398	13,398	13,398

EXCLUDING ISTANBUL, ANKARA, AND IZMIR

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Female labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.768*** (0.241)	-0.793*** (0.272)	-1.062*** (0.335)	-0.939*** (0.308)	-1.038*** (0.379)	-1.282*** (0.451)	0.18
Observations	11,058	11,058	11,058	11,058	11,058	11,058	
Has personal income	-0.646*** (0.243)	-0.649** (0.248)	-0.719** (0.289)	-0.701** (0.294)	-0.713** (0.303)	-0.777** (0.348)	0.11
Observations	11,060	11,060	11,060	11,060	11,060	11,060	
Panel B: Male labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	0.037 (0.138)	0.304 (0.296)	0.224 (0.305)	-0.042 (0.179)	0.257 (0.363)	0.188 (0.390)	0.77
Observations	10,731	10,731	10,731	10,731	10,731	10,731	
Panel C: Being forced to drop out of the labor market by the husband							
Forced to drop out of labor market	0.002 (0.251)	0.006 (0.254)	0.037 (0.309)	0.149 (0.230)	0.165 (0.233)	0.205 (0.281)	0.23
Observations	11,060	11,060	11,060	11,060	11,060	11,060	
Forced to drop out of labor market in the last 12 months	0.052 (0.136)	0.047 (0.132)	0.076 (0.163)	0.132 (0.118)	0.109 (0.099)	0.139 (0.128)	0.11
Observations	11,042	11,042	11,042	11,042	11,042	11,042	

EXCLUDING HATAY, KILIS, AND SANLIURFA

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A: Female labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.891** (0.432)	-1.048** (0.478)	-1.377*** (0.409)	-1.541*** (0.332)	-2.020*** (0.480)	-1.690*** (0.371)	0.18
Observations	12,992	12,992	12,992	12,992	12,992	12,992	
Has personal income	-1.058*** (0.306)	-1.079*** (0.324)	-1.261*** (0.300)	-1.395*** (0.297)	-1.485*** (0.320)	-1.310*** (0.288)	0.12
Observations	12,994	12,994	12,994	12,994	12,994	12,994	
Panel B: Male labor market outcomes							
Worked last week	-0.042 (0.334)	0.739 (0.731)	0.365 (0.702)	-0.939* (0.549)	0.114 (0.767)	0.477 (0.859)	0.77
Observations	12,655	12,655	12,655	12,655	12,655	12,655	
Panel C: Being forced to drop out of the labor market by the husband							
Forced to drop out of labor market	0.268 (0.281)	0.274 (0.311)	0.463 (0.310)	0.682 (0.529)	0.737 (0.501)	0.553 (0.358)	0.24
Observations	12,994	12,994	12,994	12,994	12,994	12,994	
Forced to drop out of labor market in the last 12 months	0.273 (0.209)	0.256 (0.215)	0.239 (0.226)	0.161 (0.223)	0.104 (0.199)	0.126 (0.167)	0.10
Observations	12,975	12,975	12,975	12,975	12,975	12,975	

FEMALE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES BY SECTOR

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:							
Public employment	-0.091 (0.095)	-0.102 (0.104)	-0.090 (0.096)	-0.169* (0.096)	-0.166 (0.114)	-0.172* (0.098)	0.03
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Private employment	-0.705*** (0.189)	-0.723*** (0.211)	-0.720*** (0.189)	-0.516*** (0.119)	-0.511*** (0.125)	-0.445*** (0.121)	0.15
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Panel B:							
Agricultural employment	-0.264* (0.136)	-0.283** (0.118)	-0.267** (0.134)	-0.294* (0.177)	-0.289** (0.147)	-0.280 (0.188)	0.05
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Industrial employment	-0.054 (0.059)	-0.045 (0.050)	-0.058 (0.057)	-0.041 (0.062)	-0.043 (0.049)	-0.020 (0.048)	0.02
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Service employment	-0.519** (0.218)	-0.538** (0.245)	-0.526** (0.217)	-0.408* (0.214)	-0.402* (0.244)	-0.374** (0.186)	0.11
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	

MALE LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES BY SECTOR

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:							
Public employment	0.110 (0.236)	0.114 (0.232)	0.076 (0.201)	-0.049 (0.250)	-0.390 (0.256)	-0.353 (0.281)	0.11
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Private employment	-0.251 (0.305)	-0.136 (0.305)	-0.102 (0.317)	-0.280 (0.334)	0.098 (0.533)	0.149 (0.646)	0.66
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Panel B:							
Agricultural employment	-0.239** (0.102)	-0.251 (0.192)	-0.233 (0.190)	-0.366*** (0.124)	-0.189 (0.149)	-0.177 (0.160)	0.06
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Industrial employment	-0.705** (0.352)	0.019 (0.212)	-0.001 (0.201)	-1.139*** (0.374)	-0.117 (0.137)	-0.099 (0.138)	0.16
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	
Service employment	0.818** (0.397)	0.236 (0.413)	0.232 (0.438)	1.211*** (0.334)	0.054 (0.453)	0.116 (0.489)	0.54
Observations	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	13,059	

EXCLUDING HATAY, KILIS, SANLIURFA

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Physical violence index	-2.771*** (0.624)	-2.562*** (0.642)	-2.851*** (0.591)	-3.752*** (0.670)	-3.290*** (0.705)	-3.003*** (0.667)	-0.01
Observations	12,989	12,989	12,989	12,989	12,989	12,989	
Sexual violence index	-1.078 (0.779)	-0.782 (0.729)	-1.541** (0.633)	-2.811** (1.382)	-2.200* (1.188)	-1.481* (0.772)	-0.01
Observations	12,991	12,991	12,991	12,991	12,991	12,991	
Psychological violence index	-0.897 (1.011)	-0.520 (0.996)	-1.691* (0.958)	-3.418 (2.365)	-2.674 (2.026)	-1.565* (0.823)	0.01
Observations	12,991	12,991	12,991	12,991	12,991	12,991	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

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EXCLUDING ISTANBUL, ANKARA, AND IZMIR

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Physical violence index	-1.503** (0.597)	-1.472*** (0.532)	-1.591*** (0.549)	-1.735** (0.710)	-1.608*** (0.623)	-1.718*** (0.644)	0.01
Observations	11,055	11,055	11,055	11,055	11,055	11,055	
Sexual violence index	-1.159*** (0.279)	-1.138*** (0.289)	-1.508*** (0.352)	-1.229*** (0.366)	-1.145*** (0.362)	-1.451*** (0.377)	0.01
Observations	11,057	11,057	11,057	11,057	11,057	11,057	
Psychological violence index	-0.787 (0.519)	-0.759 (0.555)	-1.092* (0.597)	-1.114** (0.483)	-1.003* (0.541)	-1.300** (0.539)	0.03
Observations	11,057	11,057	11,057	11,057	11,057	11,057	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

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REDUCED-FORM EFFECTS ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OUTCOMES

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Physical violence index	-0.025*** (0.008)	-0.023*** (0.007)	-0.022*** (0.008)
Observations	13,412	13,412	13,412
Sexual violence index	-0.026*** (0.006)	-0.025*** (0.006)	-0.020*** (0.005)
Observations	13,413	13,413	13,413
Psychological violence index	-0.030*** (0.010)	-0.028*** (0.010)	-0.021*** (0.006)
Observations	13,414	13,414	13,414
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x
Individual characteristics	x	x	x
Log trade volume		x	x
Baseline trade interacted with time			x

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON GENDER ATTITUDES

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
A woman should not argue with partner if she disagrees with him	-0.629*	-0.622*	-0.631*	-0.508	-0.477	-0.487	0.44
Observations	(0.371) 13,328	(0.362) 13,328	(0.370) 13,328	(0.423) 13,328	(0.400) 13,328	(0.421) 13,328	
Men can beat their partners in certain situations	-0.205	-0.268	-0.185	-0.294	-0.565	-0.532	0.21
Observations	(0.645) 13,092	(0.592) 13,092	(0.620) 13,092	(0.644) 13,092	(0.504) 13,092	(0.560) 13,092	
A woman should be able to spend her money as she wills	-0.065	-0.065	-0.052	0.065	0.070	-0.095	0.68
Observations	(0.351) 13,279	(0.348) 13,279	(0.346) 13,279	(0.564) 13,279	(0.536) 13,279	(0.481) 13,279	
It may be necessary to beat children for discipline	-0.023	-0.027	-0.020	-0.061	-0.079	-0.092	0.30
Observations	(0.262) 13,370	(0.262) 13,370	(0.259) 13,370	(0.287) 13,370	(0.280) 13,370	(0.243) 13,370	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

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EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON MARRIAGE MARKET OUTCOMES

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A:							
Husband had a second wife	0.076 (0.072)	0.074 (0.069)	0.077 (0.071)	0.105 (0.087)	0.097 (0.082)	0.091 (0.080)	0.01
Observations	13,416	13,416	13,416	13,416	13,416	13,416	
Husband has a second wife	0.059 (0.045)	0.056 (0.040)	0.059 (0.044)	0.070 (0.057)	0.057 (0.050)	0.064 (0.055)	0.00
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Panel B:							
Husband's age	-1.782 (3.484)	-1.539 (3.269)	-1.684 (3.300)	-1.263 (3.273)	-0.275 (2.897)	-2.440 (2.867)	40.04
Observations	13,328	13,328	13,328	13,328	13,328	13,328	
Husband's schooling	-0.983 (1.656)	-0.862 (1.636)	-1.225 (1.336)	-2.581 (2.700)	-2.107 (2.437)	-0.053 (2.033)	8.24
Observations	13,123	13,123	13,123	13,123	13,123	13,123	
Husband's religiosity	0.014 (0.356)	-0.031 (0.292)	0.033 (0.371)	0.439 (0.493)	0.264 (0.372)	0.214 (0.406)	0.03
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Marriage decision	-0.088 (0.357)	-0.088 (0.359)	-0.085 (0.360)	0.206 (0.440)	0.210 (0.423)	0.167 (0.412)	0.46
Observations	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	13,412	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	

EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON CO-RESIDENCE WITH PARENTS

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Co-residing with parent in laws	-0.308 (0.271)	-0.323 (0.246)	-0.312 (0.269)	-0.269 (0.336)	-0.328 (0.296)	-0.228 (0.339)	0.12
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Co-residing with any parent	-0.124 (0.237)	-0.137 (0.216)	-0.126 (0.235)	-0.005 (0.286)	-0.056 (0.251)	0.015 (0.285)	0.14
Observations	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	13,417	
Province and year fixed effects	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Individual characteristics	x	x	x	x	x	x	
Log trade volume		x	x		x	x	
Baseline trade interacted with time			x			x	


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EFFECTS OF REFUGEE INFLOWS ON DIVISION OF LABOR WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD

	OLS			IV			Mean
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
Cooking	0.221 (0.148)	0.218 (0.143)	0.214 (0.138)	0.214 (0.201)	0.194 (0.192)	0.204 (0.189)	0.92
Observations	13,855	13,855	13,855	13,855	13,855	13,855	
Setting and cleaning the dining table	0.031 (0.177)	0.025 (0.176)	0.024 (0.183)	0.108 (0.328)	0.051 (0.291)	0.054 (0.246)	0.87
Observations	13,837	13,837	13,837	13,837	13,837	13,837	
Cleaning work such as wiping and sweeping	0.210 (0.146)	0.211 (0.146)	0.174 (0.139)	0.023 (0.337)	0.033 (0.293)	0.131 (0.165)	0.88
Observations	13,849	13,849	13,849	13,849	13,849	13,849	
Washing the dishes/placing the dishes in the dishwasher	0.062 (0.195)	0.061 (0.195)	0.050 (0.204)	-0.101 (0.295)	-0.105 (0.266)	-0.073 (0.216)	0.89
Observations	13,853	13,853	13,853	13,853	13,853	13,853	
Doing the laundry	0.107 (0.134)	0.104 (0.130)	0.101 (0.126)	0.145 (0.178)	0.118 (0.164)	0.125 (0.157)	0.93
Observations	13,855	13,855	13,855	13,855	13,855	13,855	
Doing reparations or amendments	0.225 (0.171)	0.220 (0.179)	0.250 (0.180)	0.439** (0.217)	0.390* (0.217)	0.316* (0.182)	0.07
Observations	13,656	13,656	13,656	13,656	13,656	13,656	
Household chores index	0.456 (0.330)	0.444 (0.315)	0.450 (0.326)	0.508 (0.474)	0.390 (0.420)	0.373 (0.369)	0.03
Observations	13,863	13,863	13,863	13,863	13,863	13,863	

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EVENT STUDY TO EXAMINE PRE-TRENDS



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