

The Halting Gender Reforms in Burundi

By

**Ranjana Sinha
Simeon Djankov**

DISCUSSION PAPER NO 875

May 2023

Any opinions expressed here are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the FMG. The research findings reported in this paper are the result of the independent research of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the LSE.

The Halting Gender Reforms in Burundi

Ranjana Sinha and Simeon Djankov¹

May 2023

In the sixty years since its independence Burundi has taken some steps to improve the legal standing of women in the economy and society. These steps are partial, as they do not include changes in the property and inheritance laws, the two most importance areas for the economic independence of women. Furthermore, the legal changes in other areas, for example labor law, are not enforceable in the customary law system that handles over ninety percent of such cases. Women have little judicial recourse to defend their legal rights, which implies that in practice these rights are tenuous.

¹ This research is funded by the John Templeton Foundation's grant 62616 "Women's Empowerment, Economic Freedom, and the Role of Law in Driving Prosperity." Both authors are with the Financial Markets Group at the London School of Economics. Contact: s.djankov@lse.ac.uk.

1. Introduction

Women in Burundi are greatly disadvantaged in the performance of economic activity. Cultural norms restrict a woman's role to domestic work, where they are responsible for the upkeep of the household and childcare (USAID 2022). Navigating her way through life, the woman is first economically dependent on her father and then on her husband (Basse and Kwizera 2017). From a young age, girls are taught household tasks and hard labour on the fields but also how to accept subordination from their husbands (Nintunze and Bigirimana 2021). With few economic opportunities outside the home, women are also involved in unpaid agricultural production of food crops and other forms of informal economic activities (Basse and Kwizera 2017). Although both men and women are involved in producing and selling crops, only the men decide how to use the harvest proceeds (Iradukunda et. al., 2019).

Several professions are solely reserved for men owing to sector-specific regulations and tradition, for instance, masonry and wood-cutting. Moreover, in the absence of legal provisions protecting women's employment opportunities, many private employers prefer not to employ women because of pregnancy, childcare responsibilities, and family pressure that could affect their attendance at work (Nintunze and Bigirimana 2021).

Legal inequality is even more pronounced in the social field. In Burundi, 19% of women aged 20–24 years old were married or in a union before age eighteen (United Nations 2022). High school dropout rates due to unwanted pregnancies and the disproportionate share of household responsibilities borne by women and girls are pressing issues affecting young Burundian women. The law does not recognize women as heads of household (Burundi Code of Persons and the Family 1980). Women have no mobility, as legally they are considered to be property (OMCT 2001). Domestic violence and abuse are widespread and commonly accepted as punishment (Saiget 2020). Only women could be punished for the crime of adultery under the 1981 Penal Code (article 362). The women who manage to achieve financial independence are looked down upon by the society, with questions raised about the woman's morality (Nintunze and Bigirimana 2021).


Land is the primary source of income for most families in Burundi, but there is no law concerning matrimonial regimes, inheritance, or property rights in the country. As a result, the ownership of land is governed by customary law, which dictates that property be passed from father to son, thus excluding women from land ownership (Nzoyisenga 2020). Widows are left at the mercy of their in-laws who decide whether to provide for them or send them back to their family (Castillejo 2011). The practice of levirate (a widow marrying her deceased husband's brother) is common and often the only way for the widow to ensure her livelihood. Unmarried daughters and divorcees get a small plot of land from their family for subsistence agriculture, and their children cannot inherit these lands (Nzoyisenga 2020).

There have been steps to improve the legal conditions for women. The first attempts at legal reform in Burundi started following the country's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in 1992. But even after the 1993 elections when Sylvie Kinigi was appointed the first-ever woman Prime Minister in Burundi, women accounted for only 2 out of 23 cabinet members and 8 out of 81 of members of the single-chamber parliament or National Assembly. The then Minister for Social Affairs and Advancement of Women Romaine Ndorimana demonstrated the government's efforts to

improve the legal status of women through partial amendments to the Code of the Person and the Family and the Labour Code in 1993 (United Nations 2000).

The amendment to the former act gave women the right to choose where to live, get a job in the same way as a man, and obtain judgement in divorce in the same way as a man. The labour reforms prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis of gender and dismissal of female workers on the grounds of pregnancy. These legal reforms signified a start to the process of treating women more equally and were reflected in a jump in Burundi’s score on the World Bank’s *Women Business and the Law* index from 47.5 in 1993 to 64.4 in 1995 (figure 1).

Figure 1: Formal Legal Changes in the Status of Women in Burundi



Source: World Bank (2023).

The 1993 Personal and Family Code still contained discriminatory provisions that codified cultural traditions that advantaged men over women. These include article 38, which sets the age of marriage at 21 for men and 18 for women, and article 122, according to which “the husband is the head of the conjugal community”. Also, women on maternity leave could only get half of their salary by application of the Labour Code of 1993 (art. 123 para 4).

Legal change was brought to an abrupt halt, however, by the start of a civil war in 1993. A coup resulted in the assassination of the newly elected Hutu President Melchior Ndadaye by Tutsi soldiers and started off a decade-long conflict, until 2005 (Ndikumana 1998). Since the country’s independence from Belgium in 1962, militants from the majority Hutu group had carried out continuous attacks to overthrow the political dominance of the Tutsis, resulting in three decades of sporadic coups and many casualties. Ethnic differences and a desire for dominance among the country’s two main ethnic groups had resulted in several previous civil

wars, with massacres taking place in 1965, 1972 and 1988, prior to the 1993 outbreak (Boshoff, Very and Rautenbach 2010).

An estimated 800,000 people fled to Tanzania and further 300,000 were internally displaced (United Nations 2004). As the militant groups trained young men and even children in aggressive masculinity in preparation for war, the outbreak put women from all ethnic groups at further risk of violence and sexual exploitation (Daley 2008). Armed rebels and army soldiers raped and assaulted women, with the atrocities particularly grave at the displacement camps. These incidences of sexual violence were severely underreported owing to the stigma associated with such reporting (Daley 2008).

The civil war was also responsible for increased incidences of domestic violence and marital rape as many men were unable to provide for their families and turned to alcohol in frustration (OMTC 2001). Rural women were the most economically affected as many found themselves responsible for their household when husbands moved away to join the militias or were killed in the course of the conflict.

Recourse to the judicial system for women has remained limited. Evidence from a household survey on dispute resolution cases suggests that formal courts were used for dispute resolution in less than eight percent of civil cases. The lack of access in the delivery of formal justice means that the vast share of women in Burundi cannot defend their legal rights, even in the areas where such rights exist. It can be stated that women in Burundi have tenuous rights, absent a significant transformation of the justice system.

This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents the role of women in post-war resolution in Burundi. Section 3 discusses the legal changes taking place after the Arusha peace accord. Section 4 shows how the dominance of customary law largely negates the newly-established legal rights of women. Section 5 concludes.

2. The Role of Women in Post-War Resolution

The long-drawn civil war affected women in different ways than men. Almost every woman had experienced sexual violence, internal displacement, loss of male family members, or loss of land. This distress brought women together as they mobilized into activist groups lobbying for peaceful resolution (Anderson 2010). During the Arusha peace negotiations between 1998 and 2000, these women's groups demanded a say in the contents of the peace accord. Persistent pressure earned some women observer status at the peace talks (Falch 2010). In July 2000, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, one of the prominent women's organizations, held the All-Women's Peace Conference to connect representatives from political parties with women's groups and the main political party Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA) agreed to include several issues relating to women's welfare in the peace agreement and guarantee a 30% quota for women in the new government (Anderson 2016).

The peace agreement signed later that year called for the repeal of discriminatory laws, recognizing women's land ownership and inheritance rights, equal access to education and employment and an end to gender-based violence. However, the 30% quota for women was dropped out from the agreement owing to "an insufficient number of women qualified to hold

office” (Falch 2010). Also, under the Nationality Law of 2000 women married to foreigners had to go through a long, costly, and complicated process to pass their Burundian nationality to their husbands and children. However, Burundian men could pass their nationality to foreign-born spouses through a simple declaration (Law n. 1/013 of July 18, 2000, reforming the Nationality Code of Burundi, articles 4 and 10).

Women’s civil groups continued to lobby for political representation. Their steady efforts succeeded when a 30% quota for female political representation was incorporated into the new Constitution adopted in 2005 (Falch 2010; Anderson 2016). Consequently, in the elections held in 2005, women occupied 31% of the seats in the National Assembly and 35% of the seats in the Senate (IPU 2005). This was a significant achievement: archives show that while women were elected in parliament for the first time in 1982, and appointed to the Executive branch for the first time in 1984, their representation in those bodies had consistently fluctuated below 10 percent until 2005.

The 2005 general elections, the first test of the gender quota, resulted in historic gains for women. Women’s representation jumped from 12% to 37%, from 19% to 31%, and from 19% to 35% in the Executive branch, the National Assembly (upper chamber), and the Senate, respectively. Women inherited the positions of Speaker of the National Assembly and 2nd Vice-President of the Republic. The same trend continued steadily until 2020. During the 2015-2020 period (the last legislature governed by the 2005 constitution) women represented 37% of members in parliament and 32% of officials in the executive branch (Nzoyisenga 2020).

In other institutions where the 30% minimum quota for women was not legally required—including in public administration at large, diplomatic posts, the judiciary, and defence and security forces—the 2005 Constitution instead mandated “gender equilibriums” (art. 135, 208, 255). This mandate, too, was successfully implemented. By 2020, women made up at least 30% of members at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVR Burundi), the National Independent Commission on Human Rights (CNIDH), and the National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI Burundi). In 2011, the Burundian legislature even went as far as to require a minimum of 30% women in the compositions of national and provincial executive committees of political parties (art. 33 of the law of political parties), a quota that has been followed.

Despite the quotas for female representation in parliament, there has been concern about women’s effective participation in political decision-making (Falch 2010; Castillejo 2011). Interviews with female members of Parliament and women’s rights activists revealed that female politicians sometimes faced the threat of losing party patronage if they were too vocal about women’s issues (Cornwall and Goetz 2005).

Burundi and its neighbour Rwanda share similarities in the process of ensuring female political participation through legislation, but the outcomes of such representation in the two countries differ vastly. While female politicians were the drivers of gendered legal reform and economic reconstruction in Rwanda (Sinha and Djankov 2023), their Burundian counterparts failed to achieve similar success. One reason for this difference is the process of election of women to political offices. In Burundi, aspiring female politicians have to either garner support from customary leaders to mobilise sufficient votes (Castillejo 2011) or pay for their own political campaigns in order to be allowed to participate in the gender quota (Falch 2010). Since customary leaders are traditionally against women’s participation in politics, most female

parliamentarians have to pay their way to the electoral lists and often come from well-off families, facing different challenges from the average woman in Burundi. This pre-selection of women politicians is in stark contrast to Rwanda, where female parliamentarians come from varied backgrounds and run on nationwide tickets independent of local customary chiefs.

3. Legal Changes after the Peace Accord

Attention to the frequency of gender-based violence in Burundi was drawn during the civil war of 1993-2005 by the humanitarian and aid workers deployed in the country by international organisations. Prior to this period sexual abuse and intimate-partner violence largely went unreported owing to the social stigma associated with it. In fact, customary courts do not consider forced intercourse among married couples as rape (OMCT 2001).

During the civil war, incidences of sexual violence by armed rebels and army soldiers spiked up. The signing of the peace accords in 2003 led to little improvement. Women and young girls in female-headed households were particularly at risk, since the absence of a male authority figure in the family made others perceive them as unprotected prey (Zicherman 2007). Local officials would ask for sexual favours in exchange for food or other necessities (CARE International 2005).

Despite repeated recommendations from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, no action had been taken by the government to address gender-based violence in the years immediately after the signing of the peace accords. Finally, following the Committee's periodic report for 2007, Burundi adopted some measures to address the issue (United Nations 2015). The Criminal Code was amended on April 22, 2009, with clauses that introduced punishments for perpetrators of gender-based violence and penalised sexual harassment at the workplace.

Additionally, the adoption of a new law on criminal procedure in 2013 (amended in 2018) gives civil society organizations the possibility of supporting victims of sexual violence in their quest for justice (art. 64 para 4 and 5), which was followed by the adoption of a law against sexual and gender-based violence in 2016. The legal change recognised both domestic violence and sexual harassment as punishable offences, thereby increasing Burundi's *Women Business and the Law* index score from 64.4 to 73.1 (figure 1).

No legal progress was, however, made regarding women's ownership rights. The ownership and succession of land in Burundi has always been governed by customary law that does not recognize the right of women to inherit land (Nintunze and Bigirimana 2021; Nzoyisenga 2020). The issue of women's inheritance was first raised at a conference in Berlin in 1975 dedicated to the United Nations' International Year of Women, initiated by the Union des Femmes Burundaises (UFB), the women's wing of the country's largest party Union pour le Progrès National (UPRONA). Consequently, women's land inheritance rights were the object of several legislative agendas between 1977 and 1993, with unsuccessful draft bills on the same in 1983 and 1993 (Saiget 2016).

First started by the women of the UFB party, the struggle for achieving land rights was joined by women's civil societies and human rights organisations that emerged in the wake of the civil

war. As these efforts intensified, they received support from the United Nations, who encouraged forging a close relationship between the women's wings of the two main political parties at the time, UPRONA and FRODEBU (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi) (Saiget 2016). However, their joint attempts to bring forward legislation on women's inheritance failed repeatedly over a dozen years.

With the establishment of the 30% quota on female representation in Parliament and the principle of gender equality enshrined in the new Constitution of 2005, there was a renewed optimism about codifying women's inheritance rights. However, legislative councils in parliament purposefully slowed the process under the excuse of raising community awareness on the issue (Saiget 2016). During this time, women's civil societies diversified their agendas and moved on to other goals such as reducing gender-based violence, so the movement for inheritance rights lost some momentum (Saiget 2016). Moreover, the female members of the new ruling party CNDD-FDD (Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie–Forces de défense de la démocratie), which had been one of the many rebel groups during the war, had little in common with the members of the UFB who had started the movement and were now members of women's civil societies.

Parliamentary discussions on the ownership and succession of land bill drafted in 2004 finally began in 2010. However, legal change faced another halt when President Pierre Nkurunziza questioned the adoption of the law in a public speech and raised concern over ethnic conflicts that could be triggered by it (Saiget 2016). This made clear that the ruling party was far from eager to support the law on women's inheritance. Besides, a presidential decree of 2017 came to reinforce gender inequality by preventing women from touching Burundian traditional drums, which are considered sacred (art. 3).

The revisions of the Labor Code in 2020 focused on wage and payment issues and left the gender discriminatory sector-specific texts untouched. The salary is determined by the order of the Minister in charge of Labour. After consulting the National Labour Council, the Minister's orders establish, for a maximum of four years, the guaranteed professional minimum basic wages; the minimum increase for overtime work and night work, as well as for work performed during weekly rest days and holidays; and the annual wage increase for seniority. Payment, all or part, of wages in kind was prohibited. Also, payment of wages in a form of liquor or drugs was prohibited. The employer is no longer allowed to compel workers to spend their salary in a certain way. Workers are entitled to the wages without any kind of deduction that involve direct or indirect payments by the worker. An employer should provide pay slips to all employees on each pay day. Payment must be recorded on a pay slip issued to the worker at time of payment.

Much discourse and confrontation between civil society organisations and the government has followed over the last half dozen years, with little effect. The government has sanctioned parliamentary and expert committees to undertake studies on gender issues, while women's organisations have reframed the inheritance issue as equality in access to resources. While women's civil societies blame the ineffectiveness of female parliamentarians, the latter in turn blame their male colleagues who vehemently oppose legal reforms.

The 2020-2027 legislature governed by the new 2018 Constitution, which maintains the minimum 30% gender quota for women's representation in the legislature and the executive

branch and extends it to the judiciary (article 213). As a result, women have a critical mass in all three branches of state power. The latter is important in view of the prevailing traditional gender biases that customary law holds.

4. The Prevalence of Customary Law in Burundi

The legal system in Burundi is characterised by the co-existence and spontaneous cooperation between codified civil law and unwritten customary law. There are three key justice actors at the local level in Burundi: (1) the hill council, (2) the customary judges (Kirundi: *bashingantahe*), and (3) the municipal court (Chaara et al 2022). The hill council is made up of six community members including the hill leader. It is responsible for ‘ensuring arbitration, mediation, conciliation and neighborhood dispute resolution on the territory of the hill’ but there are no specific rules or procedures pertaining to those mediations and conciliations (République du Burundi, 2010: art 36).

The council of custom-derived notables or *bashingantahe* has been the local purveyor of justice and administration since pre-colonial times (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012). Legal rules delineating the role of these ‘wise-men’ who mediate civil and neighborhood disputes were inserted into Belgian law as adopted by Burundi during the independence process.

The municipal court is the lowest level of the judiciary and is responsible for dealing with land issues as well as all minor civil issues (civil and family status, family disputes, etc.) and minor offences (insult, minor damage). Each ruling in a municipal court is made by three judges, along with a president, in accordance with Burundian law. The municipal court sits in each municipality and decisions can be appealed to the provincial court located in the provincial capital.

All three venues for resolving disputes are male dominated (less than 10% of judges in municipal courts are women and the hill council and *bashingantahe* are all men). The latter is encompassed within the traditional institution of *Bashîngantâhe*, local justice rendered by the wise men in disputes and conflicts arising in the community (Cadinot 2021; Niyonkuru 2021).² Although the Constitution contains a provision giving state courts monopoly over ensuring justice, customary courts supplement the formal courts in a way that over 90% of Burundian citizens rely on customary courts (the hill council or the *Bashîngantâhe*) in resolving disputes over family matters, petty crime, land, and inheritance (Ministry to the Presidency in Charge of Good Governance, Privatization, General Inspection of the State and Local Administration 2008; Niyonkuru 2021).

Despite the enactment of legal reform in the civil and criminal codes, these changes have not been applied to customary law since the dual nature of the judicial system is explicitly

² The term “*Bashingantahe*” is a Burundian compound word with roots in two words: “*gushinga*” (to plant or to fix) and “*intahe*” (a stick from the ficus tree). It means “the gesture of planting or fixing a stick into the ground.” In its broader sense, the *Bashingantahe* refers to a customary institution of “wise men”, whose main role is to manage and resolve conflicts and disputes that arise in the community, through processes based on traditional techniques of conflict resolution consisting of negotiation, mediation, reconciliation and arbitration.

recognised in the Constitution (Niyonkuru 2021). Consequently, women have limited access to justice and receive unequal treatment in all matters that go to the customary courts. Women, especially those in rural areas, are often unaware of the formal legal avenues available to them. In cases of inheritance, dissolution of marriage, and settlement of marital regimes, parties to the dispute have no choice but to use the customary system, and women cannot make their decision based on where they hope to achieve a fair outcome (Von Benda-Beckman 1981; Chopra and Isser 2012).

Chara et al (2022) use data from a household survey on actual dispute resolution cases in 2014 and find that municipal (formal) courts are used as a sole dispute resolution mechanism in less than eight percent of these cases. The vast majority of cases is resolved in the customary system. Even when cases do end up in the municipal courts, women's access to justice is worsened by the deep-rooted influence of traditional values in the minds of the formal judges (Rosine 2018). State courts seldom pass judgements on issues such as dissolution of marriage, equal division of marital property, inheritance, and even gender-based violence, instead referring them to the customary system (Niyonkuru 2021).

The situation is made worse by the fact that women themselves are sceptical of state courts and prefer to seek justice in informal courts despite knowing that they are likely to lose their case. A survey conducted by UN Women (2021) to analyse women's access to justice in cases of gender-based violence revealed that 54% of the respondents had no trust in the public justice system, owing to a variety of factors including high costs and complex procedures. Most women came from poor rural households and could not afford to pay high legal fees or hire a lawyer. The majority of those surveyed trusted customary courts for dispute resolution, not for their fairness but for the fact that they do not require as much bribes or fees as the state legal system. The ones who did not trust customary courts cited their reasons as gender-blind legal practices arising out of outdated cultural caveats and dominance of the men. The exclusion of women from the customary councils hampered the gender-sensitivity of their rulings. Thus, a patriarchal mentality among formal judges combined with the prevalence of customary law leaves women in Burundi with few legal rights.

5. Conclusions

In the sixty years since its independence, Burundi has made some formal legal changes towards equal social and economic treatment of women and men. Importantly, huge legal gaps remain, in particular in the area of land ownership and inheritance rights. In all other areas, however, the practice differs from the law: women often have no formal judicial recourse to enforce their legal rights.

The findings call into question the progress that has been made in the legal rights of women in Burundi. Consecutive governments have changes legal texts while recognizing that their application is problematic. Furthermore, some positive steps towards legal change have been followed by steps in the opposite direction. The lack of consistency in the legislative process is symptomatic of the unwillingness to prioritize women's social and economic rights.

References

- Anderson, Miriam J. 2010. "[Transnational Feminism and Norm Diffusion in Peace Processes: The Cases of Burundi and Northern Ireland.](#)" *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 4(1), 1-21.
- Anderson, Miriam J. 2016. "[Windows of Opportunity: How Women Seize Peace Negotiations for Political Change.](#)" New York, 2016.
- Basse, Yssa Oumar, and Jocelyne Kwizera. 2017. "[Norms and Practices Impeding Gender Equality in Burundian Society](#)". CARE Burundi.
- Boshoff, Henry, Waldemar Very, and George Rautenbach. 2010. "[The Burundi Peace Process: From Civil War to Conditional Peace.](#)" Monograph 171, Institute for Security Studies.
- Cadinot, Clément. 2021. "[Bashingantahe Traditional Justice \(Burundi\): A Necessary Recognition?](#)" *Les Cahiers de la Justice*, 1(1), 67-79.
- CARE International. 2005. "Burundi: Using Innovative Approaches to Better Understand Sexual Harassment and Exploitation within the Food Distribution Program." Burundi, June 30.
- Castillejo, Clare. 2011. "[Building a State That Works for Women: Integrating Gender into Post-Conflict State Building.](#)" FRIDE Working Paper 107. FRIDE.
- Chara, I., Falisse, J.-B., and Moriceau, J. 2022. "[Does legal aid improve access to justice in 'fragile' settings? Evidence from Burundi.](#)" *Journal of Peace Research*, 59(6), 810–827.
- Chopra, Tanja, and Deborah Isser. "[Access to Justice and Legal Pluralism in Fragile States: The Case of Women's Rights.](#)" *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law*, 4(2), 337-358.
- Cornwall, Andrea, and Anne Marie Goetz. 2005. "[Democratizing Democracy: Feminist Perspectives.](#)" *Democratization*, 12(5), 783-800.
- Daley, Patricia. 2008. "Gender and Genocide in Burundi: The Search for Spaces of Peace in the Great Lakes Region." Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- Decree Law No. 1/1 of 15 January 1980 on the [Code of Persons and the Family](#). 1980.
- Falch, Ashild. 2010. "[Women's Political Participation and Influence in Post-Conflict Burundi and Nepal.](#)" *PRIO Paper*. Oslo: PRIO.
- Human Rights Watch. 1999. "[Human Rights Watch World Report 1999 – Burundi.](#)" January 1999.
- Ingelaere Bert and Dominic Kohlhagen. 2012. "Situating social imaginaries in transitional justice: The bushingantahe in Burundi." *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 6(1): 40–59.
- Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2005. "[Women in National Parliaments.](#)" Accessed: April 26, 2023.
- Iradukunda, Francois, Renee Bullock, Anne Rietveld, and Boudy Van Schagen. 2019. "[Understanding Gender Roles and Practices in the Household and on the Farm: Implications for Banana Disease Management Innovation Processes in Burundi.](#)" *Outlook on Agriculture*, 48(1), 37-47.

- Ministry to the Presidency in Charge of Good Governance, Privatization, General Inspection of the State and Local Administration. 2008. "[Etude Diagnostique sur la Gouvernance at la Corruption au Burundi.](#)" Bujumbura, May 2008.
- Ndikumana, Léonce. 1998. "[Institutional Failure and Ethnic Conflicts in Burundi.](#)" *African Studies Review*, 41(1), 29-47.
- Nintunze, Nadia, and Sabrina Bigirimana. 2021. "[Analysis of Cultural Barriers to Women's Economic Empowerment in Burundi.](#)" Search for Common Ground, U.S. Agency for International Development.
- Niyonkuru, Aimé-Parfait. 2021. "[Gender and Access to Justice in Burundi: Conflicting Norms, Gaps in the Law and the Role of Judges.](#)" *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law*, 53(3), 570-592.
- Nzoyisenga, Fikiri. 2020. "[15 Years of Gender Quotas in Burundi: What's the Impact?](#)" Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, August 26.
- Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture (OMCT). 2001. "[Violence Against Women in Burundi.](#)" 24th Session, 15 January – 2 February.
- République du Burundi. 2010. Loi 1/02 du 25 Janvier 2010 Portant Révision de la Loi 1/106 du 20 Avril 2005 Portant Organisation de l'Administration Communale [Law 1/02 of 25 January 2010 Revising Law 1/106 of 20 April 2005 on the Organisation of the Municipal Administration]. Bujumbura: République du Burundi.
- Rosine T. 2018. "Improving local land governance? Exploring the linkages between land governance reforms, institutional pluralism and tenure security in Burundi." *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law* 50(1): 31–55.
- Saiget, Marie. 2016. "[\(De-\)Politicising Women's Collective Action: International Actors and Land Inheritance in Post-War Burundi.](#)" *Review of African Political Economy*, 43(149), 365-381.
- Saiget, Marie. 2020. "[Women in Burundi.](#)" *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History*. Oxford University Press.
- Sinha, Ranjana, and Simeon Djankov. 2023. "[Gender Reform in Rwanda: Change Spurred by Tragedy.](#)" Discussion Paper 863, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics.
- UN Women. 2021. "[Multi-Country Analytical Study on Access to Justice for Victims and Survivors of Violence Against Women and Girls in East and Southern Africa.](#)" New York, October 21.
- United Nations. 2000. "[Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Initial Report of Burundi.](#)" New York, July 3.
- United Nations. 2007. "[Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Combined 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Periodic Reports of Burundi.](#)" New York, March 6.

United Nations. 2015. "[Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Combined 5th and 6th Periodic Reports of Burundi.](#)" New York, June 24.

United Nations Security Council. 2004. [Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi.](#) S/2004/210. New York, March 16.

United Nations Women. 2022. [Gender Data Gaps and Country Performance](#), New York, May 18.

United States Agency for International Development. 2022. "[USAID/Burundi Integrated Country Strategy Gender Analysis Report.](#)" Washington DC, August 10.

Von Benda-Beckman, Keebet. 1981. "[Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Processing in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra.](#)" *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law*, 13(19), 117-159.

World Bank. 2023. *Women Business and the Law 2023*, Washington DC.

Zicherman, Nona. 2007. "[Addressing Sexual Violence in Post-Conflict Burundi.](#)" *Forced Migration Review*, 27, 48-49.