

Monetary Policy and Wealth Effects: The Role of Risk and Heterogeneity

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Monetary Policy and Wealth Effects

“Perhaps the most important influence, operating through changes in the rate of interest (...) depends on the effect of these changes on the appreciation or depreciation in the price of securities and other assets.”

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Modern evidence: monetary policy affects **risk premia** on stocks and bonds

- Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); Gertler and Karadi (2015); Hanson and Stein (2015)

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Two views on how asset prices affect the **real economy**

1. Changes in asset prices create a **wealth effect**

- Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020); Chodorow-Reich et al (2020)

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Two views on how asset prices affect the **real economy**

1. Changes in asset prices create a **wealth effect**

- Cieslak and Vissing-Jorgensen (2020); Chodorow-Reich et al (2020)

2. Changes in asset prices reflect movements in **“paper wealth”**

- Cochrane (2020); Krugman (2021); Fagereng et al. (2022)

A Rare Disasters Analytical HANK Model

This paper: how MP affects the real economy through wealth effects

- Two main ingredients: **rare disasters** and **heterogeneous beliefs**
- Movements in nominal rates lead to changes in equity and term premia

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 - Time-varying risk premia and precautionary motive with first-order approximation

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 - Time-varying risk premia and precautionary motive with first-order approximation
2. The **risk-premium neutrality** result
 - Under special conditions, variations in risk premia have no effect on real economy

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1. Tractable model where MP affects risk premia
 - Time-varying risk premia and precautionary motive with first-order approximation
2. The **risk-premium neutrality** result
 - Under special conditions, variations in risk premia have no effect on real economy
3. Quantify importance of time-varying risk premia
 - Changes in asset prices are the main driver of consumption and inflation response.

Model

The Model

- **Households:** *workers, optimistic savers, and pessimistic savers*
 - Workers are hand-to-mouth and the only ones who supply labor
 - Savers invest on short-term bonds, long-term bonds, and equities
- **Firms:** sticky prices
 - Intermediate-goods producers face **aggregate disaster risk**
 - Shock with Poisson intensity $\bar{\lambda} \geq 0$ permanently reduces productivity
- **Government:** fiscal and monetary policy
 - Fiscal: lump-sum transfers and long-term debt
 - Monetary: standard interest rate rule

Savers' problem

Problem of saver $j \in \{o, p\}$:

$$V_{j,t}(B_{j,t}) = \max_{[B_{j,z}^L, B_{j,z}^E, C_{j,z}]_{z \geq t}} \mathbb{E}_{j,t} \left[\int_t^{t^*} e^{-\rho_j(z-t)} \frac{C_{j,z}^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} dz + e^{-\rho_j(t^*-t)} V_{j,t^*}^*(B_{j,t^*}^*) \right],$$

subject to

$$dB_{j,t} = \left[(i_t - \pi_t) B_{j,t} + r_{L,t} B_{j,t}^L + r_{E,t} B_{j,t}^E - C_{j,t} + T_{j,t} \right] dt + \left[B_{j,t}^* - B_{j,t} \right] d\mathcal{N}_t,$$

with subjective disaster probability λ_j .

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$$r_{L,t} \equiv \frac{1}{Q_{L,t}} + \frac{\dot{Q}_{L,t}}{Q_{L,t}} - \psi_L - i_t$$

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$$B_{j,t}^* - B_{j,t} = B_{j,t}^L \frac{Q_{L,t}^* - Q_{L,t}}{Q_{L,t}} + B_{j,t}^E \frac{Q_{E,t}^* - Q_{E,t}}{Q_{E,t}}$$

Euler equations

Short-term bonds:

$$\frac{\dot{C}_{j,t}}{C_{j,t}} = \underbrace{\sigma^{-1}(i_t - \pi_t - \rho_j)}_{\text{intertemporal substitution}} + \underbrace{\frac{\lambda_j}{\sigma} \left[\left(\frac{C_{j,t}^*}{C_{j,t}} \right)^{-\sigma} - 1 \right]}_{\text{precautionary savings}}$$

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Long-term bonds:

$$r_{L,t} = \underbrace{\lambda_j \left(\frac{C_{j,t}^*}{C_{j,t}} \right)^{-\sigma}}_{\text{price of disaster risk}} \underbrace{\frac{Q_{L,t} - Q_{L,t}^*}{Q_{L,t}}}_{\text{quantity of risk}}$$

Equities:

$$r_{E,t} = \lambda_j \left(\frac{C_{j,t}^*}{C_{j,t}} \right)^{-\sigma} \frac{Q_{E,t} - Q_{E,t}^*}{Q_{E,t}}$$

Market-implied disaster probability and the SDF

Define average savers' consumption as $C_{s,t} \equiv \frac{\mu_o}{\mu_o + \mu_p} C_{o,t} + \frac{\mu_p}{\mu_o + \mu_p} C_{p,t}$

- It is convenient to price assets using $C_{s,t}$
- Define the economy's SDF as $\eta_t = e^{-\int_0^t \rho_{s,t}} C_{s,t}^{-\sigma}$

Given this SDF, the **market-implied disaster probability** is given by

$$\lambda_t \equiv \left[\frac{\mu_o C_{o,t}}{\mu_o C_{o,t} + \mu_p C_{p,t}} \lambda_o^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} + \frac{\mu_p C_{p,t}}{\mu_o C_{o,t} + \mu_p C_{p,t}} \lambda_p^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right]^\sigma$$

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The market-implied disaster probability is potentially *time-varying*

- It increases if optimistic investors lose consumption share

Firms' problem

Firms:

- Final-goods producers: competitive, combine intermediate goods according to CES.
- Intermediate-goods producers: differentiated good, monopolistically competitive.
 - Subject to TFP shock. Poisson intensity $\bar{\lambda}$:

$$A_t = A \rightarrow A_{t^*} = A^* < A.$$

- Rotemberg price adjustment costs.

New Keynesian Phillips Curve:

$$\dot{\pi}_t = \left(\dot{i}_t - \pi_t + \lambda_t \frac{\eta_t^*}{\eta_t} \right) \pi_t - \varphi^{-1} (\epsilon - 1) \left(\frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon - 1} \frac{W_t}{P_t} \frac{1}{A} - (1 - \tau) \right) Y_t,$$

Workers and government

Workers:

- GHH preferences and hand-to-mouth
- Labor supply: $\frac{W_t}{P_t} = N_{w,t}^\phi$

Fiscal policy:

$$\dot{D}_{G,t} = (i_t - \pi_t + r_{L,t})D_{G,t} + \sum_{j \in \{w,o,p\}} \mu_j T_{j,t},$$

and No-Ponzi condition $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} E_0[\eta_t D_{G,t}] \leq 0$.

Monetary policy:

$$i_t = r_n + \phi_\pi \pi_t + u_t,$$

where $\phi_\pi > 1$. After the disaster shock, $i_t^* = r_n^* + \phi_\pi \pi_t^*$.

Equilibrium Characterization

Solution method

Solution method:

- Standard approach: approximate around non-stochastic steady state ($\lambda_t = u_t = 0$).
- **This paper:** linearize around **stationary equilibrium** with $\lambda_t = \lambda > 0$, $u_t = 0$.
 - All variables are constant in **each** aggregate state.
 - Capture time-varying precautionary savings and risk premia in a **linear** setting.

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Stationary equilibrium:

$$r_n = \rho_s - \lambda \left[\left(\frac{C_s}{C_s^*} \right)^\sigma - 1 \right], \quad r_L = \lambda \left(\frac{C_s}{C_s^*} \right)^\sigma \frac{Q_L - Q_L^*}{Q_L}, \quad r_E = \lambda \left(\frac{C_s}{C_s^*} \right)^\sigma \frac{Q_E - Q_E^*}{Q_E}.$$

- Precautionary motive depresses natural interest rate
- Upward-sloping yield curve and positive equity premium

Aggregate dynamics

Aggregate Euler equation:

$$\dot{y}_t = \tilde{\sigma}^{-1} (i_t - \pi_t - r_n) + \delta y_t + \chi_\lambda \hat{\lambda}_t .$$

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macro-EIS

Aggregate dynamics

Aggregate Euler equation:

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Aggregate Euler equation:

precautionary motive

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New Keynesian Phillips curve:

$$\dot{\pi}_t = \rho \pi_t - \kappa y_t .$$

Asset prices

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Price of risk:

$$p_{d,t} \equiv \underbrace{\sigma(c_{s,t} - c_{s,t}^*)}_{\text{change in marginal utility}} + \underbrace{\hat{\lambda}_t}_{\text{market-implied disaster probability}} .$$

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Long-term bonds:

$$q_{L,0} = - \underbrace{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho+\psi_d)t} (i_t - r_n) dt}_{\text{short-term rates}} - \underbrace{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho+\psi_d)t} r_L p_{d,t} dt}_{\text{term premium}},$$

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Stocks:

$$q_{E,0} = \underbrace{\frac{Y}{Q_E} \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \hat{\Pi}_t dt}_{\text{dividends}} - \underbrace{\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} (i_t - \pi_t - r_n + r_E p_{d,t}) dt}_{\text{discount rate}} .$$

The approximate block recursivity property

To obtain $\hat{\lambda}_t$, we need relative consumption

$$\hat{\lambda}_t \propto \left(\lambda_p^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} - \lambda_o^{\frac{1}{\sigma}} \right) [c_{p,t} - c_{o,t}]$$

This requires solving for *relative net worth* $b_{p,t} - b_{p,o}$

- In principle, need to solve for $[c_{p,t} - c_{o,t}, b_{p,t} - b_{o,t}]$ and $[y_t, \pi_t]$ simultaneously
- **Important property:** system is **block recursive** if $r_k \sigma c_{s,t}$ is small
 - Consumption fluctuations in normal times have negligible effect on risk premia

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Proposition (Approximate block recursivity)

Suppose the term $r_k \sigma c_{s,t} = \mathcal{O}(\|i_t - r_n\|^2)$ for $k \in \{L, E\}$. Then, $\hat{\lambda}_t$ is given by

$$\hat{\lambda}_t = e^{-\psi_\lambda t} \underbrace{\epsilon_\lambda (i_0 - r_n)}_{\hat{\lambda}_0},$$

where $\psi_\lambda \geq 0$ and $\epsilon_\lambda \geq 0$.

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Monetary policy and wealth effects

The two-step procedure

A monetary policy shock triggers two types of policy response:

- Changes in the **nominal interest rate** i_t
- Changes in the **fiscal backing** $\tau_t \equiv - \sum_{j \in o, p} \mu_j T_{j,t}$

To isolate the effect of nominal rates on asset prices, we proceed in two steps

1. Solve for y_t and π_t given $[i_t, \tau_t]$
2. Solve for $[i_t, \tau_t]$ given the interest rate rule.

Aggregate wealth effect

Definition

The aggregate wealth effect corresponds to (minus) the total compensation required for households' initial consumption to be just affordable:

$$\Omega_0 \equiv -\frac{1}{Y} \sum_{j \in \{w, o, p\}} \left(\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{\eta_t}{\eta_0} \mu_j C_j dt \right] - \mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{\eta_t}{\eta_0} \mu_j C_{j,t} dt \right] \right).$$

This corresponds to sum of *Hicksian wealth compensation* in Mas-Colell et al. (1995).

- This motivates our definition of wealth effects

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- This motivates our definition of wealth effects
- We can linearize Ω_0 to obtain

$$\Omega_0 = \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} c_t dt.$$

Intertemporal budget constraint

The aggregate intertemporal budget constraint is given by

$$\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{\eta_t}{\eta_0} C_t dt \right]}_{Q_{C,0}} = D_{G,0} + Q_{E,0} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_0 \left[\int_0^\infty \frac{\eta_t}{\eta_0} \left(\frac{W_t}{P_t} N_t + T_t \right) dt \right]}_{Q_{H,0}}$$

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The price of the consumption claim is given by

$$q_{C,0} = \frac{C}{Q_C} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} c_t dt - \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} (i_t - \pi_t + r_C p_{d,t}).$$

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The **aggregate wealth effect** is given by

$$\Omega_0 = \underbrace{\frac{D_G}{Y} q_{L,0} + \frac{Q_E}{Y} q_{E,0} + \frac{Q_H}{Y} q_{H,0}}_{\text{revaluation of real and financial assets}} + \underbrace{\frac{Q_C}{Y} \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} (i_t - \pi_t + r_C p_{d,t}) dt}_{\text{consumption's discount rate effect}}.$$

Wealth effects in the zero debt economy

Suppose $D_G = 0$, so savers' consumption equals dividends every period

Stocks
+
Human
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Consumption
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
$$\Omega_0 = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \left[\hat{\Pi}_t + \frac{WN}{PY} (w_t - p_t + n_t) + T_t \right] dt$$

No discount rate effect

- Same duration of assets and liabilities

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For an investor who only consumes dividends, Cochrane (2020) says

"When the interest rate goes down, it takes more wealth to finance the same consumption stream. The present value of liabilities – consumption – rises just as much as the present value of assets, so on a net basis Bob is not at all better."

Risk-premium neutrality

Proposition

Suppose the following two conditions hold:

1. The government uses a consumption tax to neutralize the precautionary motive induced by $\hat{\lambda}_t$, that is, consider τ_t^c satisfying $\hat{\tau}_t^c = \lambda \left(\frac{C_s}{C_s^*} \right) \hat{\lambda}_t$, where $\hat{\tau}_t^c \equiv \log(1 + \tau_t^c)$, $\tau_t^c = \tau_t^{c,*}$
2. One of the following conditions are satisfied: i) $\bar{d}_G = 0$; ii) $\bar{d}_G > 0$ and $\psi_L = \infty$; iii) $\bar{d}_G > 0$ and $\psi_L = 0$,

Then, $[y_t, \pi_t]_0^\infty$ is independent of $\hat{\lambda}_t$.

Aggregate output and inflation

Proposition

Aggregate output is given by

$$y_t = \underbrace{\sigma^{-1} \hat{y}_{m,t}}_{\text{ISE}} + \underbrace{\chi_{\lambda} \hat{y}_{\lambda,t}}_{\text{heterogeneous beliefs}} + \underbrace{(\rho - \underline{\omega}) e^{\omega t} \Omega_0}_{\text{GE multiplier} \times \text{aggregate wealth effect}},$$

where $\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \hat{y}_{k,t} dt = 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{y}_{k,0}}{\partial i_0} < 0$, for $k \in \{m, \lambda\}$.

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Proposition

Aggregate output is given by

$$y_t = \underbrace{\sigma^{-1} \hat{y}_{m,t}}_{\text{ISE}} + \underbrace{\chi_\lambda \hat{y}_{\lambda,t}}_{\text{heterogeneous beliefs}} + \underbrace{(\rho - \underline{\omega}) e^{\omega t} \Omega_0}_{\text{GE multiplier} \times \text{aggregate wealth effect}},$$

where $\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \hat{y}_{k,t} dt = 0$, $\frac{\partial \hat{y}_{k,0}}{\partial i_0} < 0$, for $k \in \{m, \lambda\}$.

Inflation is given by

$$\pi_t = \sigma^{-1} \hat{\pi}_{m,t} + \chi_\lambda \hat{\pi}_{\lambda,t} + \kappa e^{\omega t} \Omega_0,$$

where $\frac{\partial \hat{\pi}_{k,t}}{\partial i_0} \geq 0$, for $k \in \{m, \lambda\}$.

Determination of aggregate wealth effect

The aggregate wealth effect is given by

$$\Omega_0 \equiv \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} [(1 - \chi_{\tau})y_t - \tau_t] dt + \bar{d}_G q_{L,0} + \bar{d}_G \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} (i_t - \pi_t - r_n + r_L p_{d,t}) dt,$$

where χ_{τ} is the cyclicity of tax revenues.

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where χ_{τ} is the cyclicity of tax revenues.

Proposition

Suppose $\chi_{\tau} + \frac{\bar{d}_G \kappa}{\rho - \underline{\omega}} > 0$. Then, Ω_0 is a function of $[i_t, \tau_t]_0^{\infty}$ given by

$$\Omega_0 = \frac{\rho - \underline{\omega}}{(\rho - \underline{\omega})\chi_{\tau} + \bar{d}_G \kappa} \left[- \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} \tau_t dt + \bar{d}_G \left(q_{L,0} + \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t} (i_t - \hat{\pi}_t - r_n + r_L \hat{\lambda}_t) dt \right) \right],$$

where $\hat{\pi}_t \equiv \sigma^{-1} \hat{\pi}_{m,t} + \chi_{\lambda} \hat{\pi}_{\lambda,t}$ is a function of $[i_t]_0^{\infty}$.

Implementability condition

Our results so far expressed y_t and π_t in terms of policy variables

- But i_t and τ_t are themselves functions of the monetary shock u_t
- Taylor rule: $i_t = r_n + \phi_\pi \pi_t + u_t$

One can always find the path u_t that delivers a given $[i_t]_0^\infty$ and $\int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} \tau_t dt$:

$$i_t = \bar{i}_t + \phi_\pi (\pi_t - \bar{\pi}_t),$$

or, equivalently, $u_t = \vartheta e^{-\psi m t} (i_0 - r_n) + \theta e^{\omega t}$, given parameters ϑ and θ .

Quantitative Importance of Wealth Effects

Calibration

For the quantitative exercise, we consider two extensions

- Perpetual youth of savers: control persistence of $\hat{\lambda}_t$
- Workers can borrow a positive amount \bar{D}_p
 - Short-term safe debt, long-term risky bonds in extension

Disaster calibration follows Barro (2006)

- Y^* / Y is calibrated to match empirical distribution of disasters
- Risk aversion coefficient: $\sigma = 4 \Rightarrow$ EIS of 0.25
 - Consistent with evidence by Best et. al (2020)

Two main objects to calibrate

- The response of the **price of risk** to monetary policy ϵ_λ
- The **fiscal response** to monetary policy

The asset-pricing response to monetary shocks

Consider price of long-term bonds:

$$q_{L,0} = - \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho+\psi_d)t} (i_t - r_n) dt - \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\rho+\psi_d)t} r_L (\sigma c_{s,t} + \epsilon_{\lambda} (i_t - r_n)) dt.$$

Calibrate ϵ_{λ} to match initial response of 5-year yield on government bonds.

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


Figure: Asset-pricing response to monetary shocks with heterogeneous beliefs.

The role of heterogeneous beliefs

Heterogeneous beliefs is key for these results

- With homogeneous beliefs, model does not match movements in risk premia
- But model can still match unconditional moments

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



Figure: Long-term bond yields and output for economies with and without risk.

Estimating the fiscal response to monetary policy






Figure: Estimated fiscal response to a monetary policy shock

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1) - (2) - (3) + (4) - (5)
	Revenues	Interest Payments	Transfers & Expenditures	Debt in T	Initial Debt	Residual
Data	-26	68.88	-12.09	2.91	-49.74	30.13
	[-72.89,20.89]	[30.01,107.75]	[-48.74,24.56]	[-12.79,18.62]	[-68.03,-31.46]	[-4.74,65]

Output response with homogeneous beliefs




(a) Zero workers' debt




(b) Positive workers' debt

Figure: Homogeneous beliefs

Output response with heterogeneous beliefs






(a) Zero workers' debt



(b) Positive workers' debt

Figure: Heterogeneous beliefs



Role of Fiscal Backing



RANK relies on high EIS and strong fiscal backing

- Two panels on the left assume $\sigma = 1$
- Assuming fiscal backing in line with data cuts response in half

Borrowers and savers



Consumption response of borrowers (workers) and savers:

- Model with homogeneous beliefs relies too strongly on the response of borrowers
 - Cloyne et al (2020) estimate relative peak response of 3.6
- Model with heterogeneous beliefs generates relative response in line with data

Risk and Maturity of Household Debt

Extension: Long-term, risky household debt (e.g. mortgages)

Exponentially decaying coupons, rate: ψ_P .


In event of disaster, households **default**. Haircut: ζ_P .

Proposition (Aggregate output with long-term risky debt)

Suppose that $i_t - r_n = e^{-\psi_m t} (i_0 - r_n)$. Then

$$y_t = \underbrace{\sigma^{-1} \hat{y}_{m,t}}_{\text{ISE}} + \underbrace{\chi_d \epsilon_\lambda \hat{y}_{\lambda,t}}_{\text{heterogeneous beliefs}} + \underbrace{\frac{\mu_b \chi_r \bar{d}_P \psi_P (1 + r_P \epsilon_\lambda)}{1 - \mu_b \rho + \psi_P + \psi_m} \tilde{\psi}_m \hat{y}_t}_{\text{inside wealth effect}} + \underbrace{(\rho - \omega) e^{\omega t} \Omega_0}_{\text{GE multiplier} \times \text{aggregate wealth effect}} .$$

Output as a function of duration and haircut ζ_P



Conclusion

This paper: novel framework to study effect of monetary policy through wealth effects.

- We study the role of **risk** and **heterogeneity** in portfolios
- Model matches the response of risk premia to monetary shocks.

Risk and heterogeneity matters for monetary policy

- Heterogeneous beliefs substantially amplify output response
- Even with low EIS and matching fiscal response to monetary shocks

Thanks!!!