

**The Profitability of Block Trades
in Auction and Dealer Markets**

By

Andy Snell and Ian Tonks

DISCUSSION PAPER NO 340

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The Profitability of Block Trades in Auction and Dealer Markets

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Abstract

The paper compares the trading costs for institutional investors who are subject to liquidity shocks, of trading in auction and dealer markets. The batch auction restricts the institutions' ability to exploit informational advantages because of competition between institutions when they simultaneously submit their orders. This competition lowers aggregate trading costs. In the dealership market, competition between traders is absent but trades occur in sequence so that private information is revealed by observing the flow of successive orders. This information revelation reduces trading costs in aggregate. We analyse the relative effects on profits of competition in one system and information revelation in the other and identify the circumstances under which dealership markets have lower trading costs than auction markets and vice versa.

1 Introduction

There has been much recent debate about the appropriate form of trading mechanism for equities (see for example Madhavan (1992), Biais (1992), Pagano and Roell (1992, 1996), Shin (1996) and Vogler (1997)). This debate is particularly pertinent in the UK since in October 1997 the London Stock Exchange (LSE) changed its trading system in the most liquid securities from a dealership system (SEAQ) to a system of limit orders (SETS). Another branch of the literature has focused on the implied trading costs for large financial institutions (FI's) wishing to liquidate or acquire big blocks of securities. This focus is motivated by the large growth in equity ownership by FI's which has been documented for US corporations by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and for UK companies by Nyman and Silbertson (1978) and Leech and Leahy (1991). In fact, according to *Economic Trends 1993*, over seventy percent of UK equity is held by institutional investors, and more than eighty five per cent of equity holdings are held in blocks greater than one hundred thousand pounds in value. From the viewpoint of economic efficiency, the liquidity of secondary equity markets is important because it fundamentally affects the incentives for FI's to accumulate controlling stakes in companies and hence to monitor and improve their performance. Bhidé (1993) in a provocative paper, suggests that the deep liquidity of equity secondary equity markets in the US are to the detriment of the monitoring responsibilities of shareholders. He argues that because the secondary markets are so liquid,

shareholders have no incentive to monitor and are able "bail out" when there are any problems in the firm. Admati, Pfleiderer and Zechner (1994) examine the trade-off between the monitoring advantages of a large shareholder and the risk sharing disadvantages of large blocks for portfolio allocation decisions. Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Bolton and von Thadden (1998), Pagano and Roell (1998), Maug (1998) have focused on the advantages of a large shareholder in terms of the incentives that they have to monitor management, but the disadvantages of large blocks because of reduced liquidity, though Burkart et al (1997) argue that too much monitoring could impose too many constraints on managers to manage effectively.

The current paper adds to this branch of the literature. It develops a theoretical model of trading in equities by large FI's that are subject to stochastic liquidity shocks and that have acquired private information through monitoring about the firm whose shares they are attempting to trade. The model evaluates and compares the FI's trading costs under two separate archetypal share dealing regimes namely the call auction and dealership systems. The central feature driving the model is that large institutional shareholders face liquidity shocks, but they also possess private knowledge about the firm's value as a direct consequence of the size of their holdings. As a result, when liquidity shocks force the institutions to trade with dealers, they face unfavourable prices and high trading costs. The call auction restricts the institutions' ability to exploit informational advantages because of competition between institutions when they simultaneously submit their orders. This competition lowers aggregate trading costs. On the other hand, in the dealership market, competition between traders is absent but trades occur in sequence so that (unlike the call auction) private information is revealed by observing the flow of successive orders. This information revelation also reduces trading costs in aggregate. The net effects on FI trading costs of the competitive bids without sequential information revelation of the call auction versus the serially monopolistic bids with sequential information revelation of the dealership are evaluated and we identify the circumstances under which dealership markets have lower trading costs than auction markets and vice versa. The relative costs to the FI's of trading on the two systems hinges on a key parameter that measures the relative preponderance of asymmetric information to liquidity shocks. Where asymmetric information is more prevalent, the dealership system offers lower trading costs to the FI's. In situations where liquidity shocks are more important, the call auction would offer lower costs to the FI's.

The layout of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we outline a model of financial institutions (traders) and dealers. Sections 3 and 4 evaluate the institutions' aggregate profits and section 5 examines the circumstances (parameter values) under which one system dominates another in this regard. Section 6 examines the effects of changing the correlation structure of liquidity shocks and of allowing institutions to collude in the auction market and section 7 provides a summary and conclusion.

2 The Model

Our model follows the approach taken in Madhavan (1992), who compares a quote driven mechanism with competing dealers, with an order driven mechanism organised as a call auction. In the dealer market traders trade sequentially and therefore trade independently of subsequent trades. Whereas in the auction market all trades occur at the same time, so that traders act strategically when submitting their demands. In Madhavan (1992) traders may be acting on private information or because of a realisation of asset endowments which generates portfolio hedging trades which are not information motivated. In our model there are n traders in the market trading in a security, and they also trade for two reasons. Trader i observes the true value of the security v and is able to trade on the basis of this information in the secondary market. Each trader also faces a liquidity shock u_i , which is the second motive for trading. These traders are taken to be large risk-neutral institutional investors who discover the true value of the security v which is distributed $v \sim N(\bar{v}, \sigma_v^2)$ after monitoring the company on account of their large stake. In Madhavan (1992) traders in the market maximise an exponential utility function, whereas in this paper traders utilise a different objective function which emphasises the liquidity shocks that are faced by financial institutions. The institutional investors trade x_i in the secondary market, following Seppi (1992) to maximise the objective function in (1)

$$\pi_i | v, u = [v - p]x_i - \frac{\varphi}{2}(x_i - u_i)^2 \quad i = 1, 2, \dots, n \quad (1)$$

The objective function (1) shows that traders generate income for each unit of stock that they hold, by trading at price p when the true value of the security is v . However these traders face a liquidity shock u_i resulting in losses which are quadratic in the difference between their holdings of the asset

x_i and the liquidity shock. The relative importance of the trading profits and the liquidity shock in the investors' objective function is controlled by the parameter φ . Clearly the higher is φ the greater is the weight placed on the liquidity shock. The advantage of the specific objective function is that we are able to obtain expressions for the expected profits to an institution from trading under the two alternative microstructure systems

The institutional investors may be thought of as insurance companies who are generating premium income outside the model. A negative liquidity shock is interpreted as an unexpected insurance cash claim which must be met by the company by either selling the security or by borrowing. Under this interpretation the quadratic term $(x_i - u_i)^2$ represents increasing marginal borrowing costs. A positive liquidity shock may be interpreted as unexpected premium income and in this case costs are incurred by failing to invest this income in equities whose return exceeds that on liquid assets. In fact these costs are more likely to be linear in $(x_i - u_i)$. However, allowing for asymmetric costs would make our model analytically intractable. The quadratic term in (1) therefore, must be viewed as approximating actual costs.

Market makers who are the only other market participants, and set prices p are not able to infer exactly the value of the security from the trading behaviour of the institutions since these institutions also trade because of liquidity shocks, which are distributed $u_i \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)$. Note that if market makers also observed the value v , then they would set prices equal to the true value of the security, and traders could then set their demands equal to their liquidity shock to ensure no worse than zero profits. However because market makers do not observe v directly, but infer it from the trading volumes, they set prices to reduce the adverse selection problem from informed institutions trading against them, and we shall see that this reduces the profits of the institutions.

This model is an extension of the insider trading model developed by Kyle (1985), in which market makers set prices allowing for the likelihood that the aggregate demand will reflect informed trading by insiders. An institutional difference though is that the original Kyle model is a batch auction in which a single informed trader places his order in with a batch of liquidity orders. The model considered here allows for a different market microstructure in which traders deal directly with the market maker, but the market maker is unable to identify which components of trades are liquidity motivated and which are information motivated.

2.1 Call auction with Large Traders

A number of stock markets, such as the NYSE, London SETS and the Paris Bourse open their daily markets with a call auction. In the call auction considered here, each institutional investor simultaneously submits price contingent orders to the market, and the price is set such that market makers earn zero expected profits.¹ Aggregate trading volume is $X = \sum_{i=1}^n x_i$, and in this oligopoly call auction we recognise that each institutional trader knows that both their own trades and their rival's will have an impact on prices.

In order to find the equilibrium solution to this model we make the conjecture that the aggregate trading volume is a linear function of the information and the liquidity shocks, and competitive market makers set price as a linear function of the aggregate trading volume

$$X = \beta(v - \bar{v}) + \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma_i u_i \quad (2)$$

and

$$p = \bar{v} + \lambda X \quad (3)$$

To find the optimal trading volume of each strategic institutional trader i substitute the conjectured price function (3) into the objective function (1). The reaction function for the i th investor under the Cournot assumption that each investor's demands do not affect the demands of the rival, is given by

$$x_i = \frac{v - \bar{v}}{2\lambda + \varphi} + \frac{\varphi u_i}{2\lambda + \varphi} - \frac{\lambda(X - x_i)}{2\lambda + \varphi} \quad (4)$$

The optimal demands for trader i are seen to depend inter alia on the total order flow X but this is not observed by the trader. However, the assumption that traders are allowed to submit price contingent demands allows the trader to use the conjectured relationship between the total order flow and price (3) to effectively condition his or her orders on X . All institutions face the same problem and since aggregate trading volume is simply the sum of the n institutions' trades, summing over $i = 1$ to n in (4) and rearranging gives the aggregate trading volume as

$$X = \frac{n(v - \bar{v})}{(n+1)\lambda + \varphi} + \frac{\varphi}{(n+1)\lambda + \varphi} \sum_{i=1}^n u_i \quad (5)$$

¹Following Pagano and Roell (1996) we use the term market maker to denote any speculator involved in the provision of liquidity in an auction market.

which is indeed a linear function of the information and the liquidity shocks. Comparing coefficients in (5) and (2) yields

$$\beta = \frac{n}{(n+1)\lambda + \varphi} ; \gamma_i = \frac{\varphi}{(n+1)\lambda + \varphi} [= \gamma] \quad (6)$$

Turning to the problem faced by the market maker, we assume that the market maker acts competitively and sets prices as the expectation of the terminal value of the asset v conditional on the aggregate trading volume X so that prices are

$$p = E[v | X = \beta(v - \bar{v}) + \gamma \sum_{i=1}^n u_i] \quad (7)$$

To compute this expectation we need to make assumptions about the correlations between the liquidity shocks. In what follows we assume the liquidity shocks are independent. This could arise for example if the insurance market was divided into several niches each niche being identified with an independent source of risk and with a firm insuring against that risk. An assumption at the other extreme would be that the liquidity shocks are perfectly correlated i.e. identical for all institutions. This would arise if all insurance companies fully diversified their risks in a secondary market so that they were only exposed to economy-wide systematic risk. Because our institutions are assumed to be risk neutral and therefore have no incentive to diversify risks the uncorrelated shocks assumption seems more appropriate and we take this as our main case. However, we examine the effect that the assumption of identical shocks has on our results later.

Joint normality of the models' variates guarantees that $E[v|X]$ and hence p is linear in X which confirms the conjecture for prices in equation (3). Taking the liquidity shocks to be iid and using the standard formula for the conditional expectation of normal variates gives λ in (3) as

$$\lambda = \{cov(v, X)/var(X)\} = \frac{\beta\sigma_v^2}{\beta^2\sigma_v^2 + n\gamma^2\sigma_u^2} \quad (8)$$

We now have three equations in (6) and (8) and three unknowns β, λ and γ . Solving for the unknowns we may write the conjectured coefficients as

$$\lambda = \frac{\varphi\sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2}; \quad \beta = \frac{n[\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2]}{\varphi[\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 + n\sigma_v^2]}; \quad \gamma = \frac{[\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2]}{\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 + n\sigma_v^2} \quad (9)$$

Note that the second order condition for maximisation of the traders' profits is that $\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 > \sigma_v^2$. This condition indicates that a minimum amount of noise trade variability is required to ensure that equilibrium exists and that β and γ are strictly positive.

Throughout this paper we assume that collusion between market traders is illegal and/or infeasible. However it is interesting to compare the solution to the model in (9) and the influence of the non-cooperative game played between the n institutional investors with the problem of the "multi-plant" monopoly investor which we discuss in the Appendix. In the non-cooperative equilibrium in (9) the n institutional investors are trading too intensively relative to the collusive outcome in A9. We discuss the effects of collusion in more detail later.

We now wish to compute the expected profits to each trader before they have observed either the value of the asset or their liquidity shock. We need to substitute their optimal trades back in to the objective (1) and then integrate over the joint distribution of v and u_i .

The optimal demands for each trader are obtained by substituting (2) into (4) and rearranging. For each trader i we have

$$x_i = \frac{\sigma_v^2\varphi^2 - \sigma_u^2}{\varphi(n\sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2\varphi^2)}(v - \bar{v}) + \frac{\sigma_u^2\varphi^2 - \sigma_v^2}{\sigma_u^2\varphi^2}u_i + \frac{\sigma_v^2(\sigma_v^2 - \sigma_u^2\varphi^2)}{\sigma_u^2\varphi^2(n\sigma_v^2 + \sigma_u^2\varphi^2)} \sum_{j=1}^n u_j \quad (10)$$

Substituting (3) and (10) into the profit function (1), taking expected values over the value of the asset and the liquidity shocks and multiplying by n (expected profits are identical for each trader) gives expected profits for the n institutional traders as

$$nE\pi_i^{\text{auction}} = -\frac{n\sigma_u^2}{2\varphi^3\sigma_u^2} \left[\frac{\varphi^4\sigma_u^4 + \varphi^2\sigma_u^2\sigma_v^2 + (n-1)\sigma_v^4}{\varphi^2\sigma_u^2 + n\sigma_v^2} \right] \quad (11)$$

where by abuse of notation we have used σ_u^4 and σ_v^4 to denote $(\sigma_u^2)^2$ and $(\sigma_v^2)^2$ respectively.

Equation (11) shows that expected profits are always negative. To see why this is so note that expected profits in equation (1) have two components. The first $E(v - p)x_i$ which we call trading profits represents pure expected gains or losses to the institution from trading. The second $(\varphi/2)E(x_i - u_i)^2$ which we call liquidity cost (cost because it enters institutional profits with a minus sign) is always positive.

Lemma 1 *Institutional trading profits are always zero*

Proof. Trading profits may be summed over all institutional firms and expanded as follows

$$\sum_{i=1}^n E[(v - p)x_i] = E[(v - p)X]$$

But since $p = E[v|X]$ then

$$\sum_{i=1}^n E[(v - p)x_i] = E[(v - E[v|X])X] = 0$$

Aggregate institutional trading profits are always zero and it is easy to see that this implies that each institution's trading profit is also zero. ■

Because liquidity costs are always positive, profits of each institution are always negative. The intuition as to why trading profits are zero is because faced with the adverse selection problem of trading with informed institutions, the market maker sets "fair" prices given knowledge of the current order flow i.e. he sets prices such that expected trading profits conditional on trading volume are zero. Therefore the institutions can never offset liquidity costs with trading profits. Note that if there was no adverse selection problem [$\sigma_v^2 \rightarrow 0$], then expected profits to the institutional traders in equation (??) rise to zero. In this case the market maker knows that he does not face an informed trader, and the institutions can then trade to just offset their liquidity shocks (i.e. they can trade an amount $x_i = u_i$ at a "fair" price). In the more general case [$\sigma_v^2 > 0$], the institutions are forced to trade at a loss because they are unable to credibly commit to the market maker that they are not trading on information. Of course if they make negative expected profits in the long run the institutions would cease to exist. However in reality equities pay dividends (our security does not) and insurance companies charge premiums higher than the expected insurance claims. Neither of these two sources of income are modelled here because we wished to focus on trading costs and liquidity factors alone, but they would both presumably ensure that the profits of insurance companies were positive in the long run.

Note also the market maker in the "multi-plant" monopoly case knows that the colluding institutions are acting strategically and sets a higher markup which actually reduces the monopoly profits. From the Result 3 in the

Appendix, it can be seen that expected profits in the collusive case are actually lower than the sum of the joint profits in the non-collusive case. The anomalous effect of competition in increasing institutional profits is an important feature of oligopoly call auctions. It is important to bear this effect in mind when we compare this case with that of the sequential dealership where serial monopoly exists and such competitive effects on profits are absent.

2.2 Sequential dealer market

In the sequential dealer market each investor trades separately with the market maker, and therefore the market maker may offer different prices to the different investors. The investors approach the market maker sequentially, and the market maker completes a trade with the first investor before dealing with the next. Dealer markets are to be found in less-liquid stocks on the London Stock Exchange, on the foreign exchange markets and NASDAQ. As before, the first investor maximises (1), but this time we conjecture that the trading volume of the individual investor is a linear function of the information, and the market maker sets price as a linear function of the individual investor's trading volume

$$x_1 = \beta_1(v - \bar{v}) + \gamma_1 u_1 \quad (12)$$

and

$$p_1 = \bar{v} + \lambda_1 x_1 \quad (13)$$

The first investor now acts as a monopolist and therefore does not have to worry about the effect of his rival's trading volume on prices. The optimal trading volume for the first investor is

$$x_1 = \frac{v - \bar{v}}{2\lambda_1 + \varphi} + \frac{\varphi u_1}{2\lambda_1 + \varphi} \quad (14)$$

Market makers act competitively and set prices to the first investor as the expectation of the terminal value of the asset v conditional on the first investor's trading volume x_1 . Under this assumption λ_1 is analogous to the λ of the previous section and is given as $\lambda_1 = \text{cov}(x_1, v) / \text{var}(x_1)$

Equating coefficients as before yields the three coefficients

$$\lambda_1 = \frac{\varphi \sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2}; \quad \beta_1 = \frac{[\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2]}{\varphi[\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2]}; \quad \gamma_1 = \frac{[\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2]}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2} \quad (15)$$

We again want to obtain an expression for expected profits for the trader. Using (14) and the coefficients in (15), we may write the optimal trades of the first investor as

$$x_1 = \frac{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2}{\varphi(\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)} [v - \bar{v} + \varphi u_1] \quad (16)$$

The equilibrium price faced by the first investor is obtained by substituting (16) into the conjectured pricing rule (13)

$$p_1 = \bar{v} + \frac{\sigma_v^2}{(\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)} [v - \bar{v} + \varphi u_1] \quad (17)$$

Substituting (16) and (17) into 1) and taking expected values, we obtain the expected profits of the first institutional trader in the dealer market²

$$E\pi_1^{dealer} = -\frac{\sigma_v^2}{2\varphi} \quad (18)$$

Now consider the next investor's trading strategy. This investor also trades as a monopolist and does not have to worry about the strategic implications of his rival's trading: His objective function is given by (1) which does not directly depend on previous trades. Once more we assume that the market maker sets "fair" prices i.e. sets prices equal to the expectation of v conditioned on knowledge of x_1 and x_2 . This would imply the market maker setting p_2 as the linear (least squares) projection of v on x_1 and x_2 . However to expose the recursive structure of the problem and to simplify the solution, we taking an indirect route to the setting of prices by the market maker.

First, we conjecture that in equilibrium, optimal trades in the second period are uncorrelated with those of the first. Then, following the first trade, the market maker computes an updated distribution for v given by $v \sim N(\bar{v}_1, \sigma_{v|1}^2)$ where

$$\bar{v}_1 = \bar{v} + \frac{\varphi \sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2} x_1 \quad \{= E[v | x_1] = p_1\} \quad (19)$$

and

$$\sigma_{v|1}^2 = \frac{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 \sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2} \{= \text{var}[v | x_1]\} \quad (20)$$

²Note that equation (18) can be obtained by setting $n = 1$ in equation (11), which illustrates that the first phase of the sequential dealer market coincides with the single-trade case of the auction model.

He then sets prices to the second trader in an analogous way to the first trader, $p_2 = \bar{v}_1 + \lambda_2 x_2$, where, λ_2 is analogous to λ_1 in (13) above and is given by $\lambda_2 = \text{cov}[x_2, (v - \bar{v}_1)] / \text{var}[x_2 | x_1]$. Using conjecture for prices in the profits function gives optimal demands for the second monopolist as

$$x_2 = \beta_2(v - \bar{v}_1) + \gamma_2 u_2 \quad (21)$$

which clearly shows that optimal demands in the second period x_2 , are indeed independent of those in the first x_1 , (and are also normally distributed). The independence of equilibrium trades now implies that, prices in the second period satisfy

$$p_2 = \bar{v}_1 + \lambda_2 x_2 = E(v | x_1) + \lambda_2 x_2 = p_1 + E(v | x_2) = E[v | x_1, x_2] \quad (22)$$

where the last equality confirms that the conjectured prices are indeed fair. Solutions for β_2 , λ_2 and γ_2 may be computed as in (15).

It is easily seen that the recursive solution to the problem given above for the first two trades may be generalised to trade j . Solutions for β_j , λ_j , and $E\pi_j^{\text{dealer}}$, \bar{v}_j and $\sigma_{v|j}^2 \{= \text{var}(v | x_1, x_2, \dots, x_j)\}$ may be obtained from equations (16) - (20) respectively by replacing the right hand side terms $\sigma_{v|j-1}^2$ and \bar{v}_{j-1} with σ_v^2 and \bar{v} respectively. Adapting equation (15) in this way to give solutions for β_j and λ_j

$$\lambda_j = \frac{\varphi \sigma_{v|j-1}^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_{v|j-1}^2} ; \beta_j = \frac{[\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_{v|j-1}^2]}{\varphi [\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_{v|j-1}^2]} \quad (23)$$

The solution shows clearly that λ_j is increasing in $\sigma_{v|j-1}^2$ and that β_j is decreasing in $\sigma_{v|j-1}^2$. Similarly we may adapt equations (18) and (20) to give

$$E\pi_j^{\text{dealer}} = -\frac{\sigma_{v|j-1}^2}{2\varphi} \quad j \geq 2 \quad (24)$$

$$\sigma_{v|j}^2 = \frac{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 \sigma_{v|j-1}^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_{v|j-1}^2} \quad (25)$$

respectively. Given the initial condition $\sigma_{v|0}^2 = \sigma_v^2$, Equations (24) and (25) may be solved recursively to give an explicit form for the j th trader's profits for $j=2,3,\dots,n$. To get a closed form for expected profits for the j th trader, rearrange (24) to give

$$(\sigma_{v|j}^2)^{-1} = (\sigma_{v|j-1}^2)^{-1} + (\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2)^{-1} = (\sigma_v^2)^{-1} + j \cdot (\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2)^{-1} \quad (26)$$

Using (26) on the right of (24) gives aggregate expected profits for the n institutional traders as

$$\sum_{i=1}^n E\pi_i^{dealer} = - \sum_{j=1}^n \frac{\varphi \sigma_u^2 \sigma_v^2}{2(\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + (j-1)\sigma_v^2)} \quad (27)$$

Proposition 2 $\beta_j > \beta_{j-1}$ and $\lambda_j < \lambda_{j-1}$

Proof.

From (23) β_j is decreasing in $\sigma_{v|j-1}^2$ and λ_j is increasing in $\sigma_{v|j-1}^2$. Further, (26) shows that $\sigma_{v|j-1}^2$ is decreasing with j ■

The proposition shows that the j th trader trades more aggressively than the $j-1$ th, as a consequence of the updated variance of v having fallen. Further as the covariance of the underlying value of the asset and the order flow will have fallen, the market maker set a lower mark-up to the j th trader. The information revelation that occurs as successive institutions trade increases the profits of successive traders as is clear from (27).³ This is an important effect in a sequential dealership market that is absent from a "one-off" call auction where each trader's expected profits are the same. As noted in the previous section however, the fact that each institution acts as a monopolist works to reduce the institutions' profits. We examine the net impact of the two effects of competition and sequential information revelation in the next section.

3 Comparison of the two alternative market mechanisms

To compare the expected profits under the auction and dealer markets given in (11) and (27) we first take the case of two firms (i.e. the cases of duopoly and two sequential monopolists respectively) and then generalise to n firms. The following theorem which is the main result of the paper, states that

³We make the standard assumption in models of sequential dealership markets that traders arrive in random order. See, for example Glosten and Milgrom (1985), Madhavan (1992), Shin (1996)

whether one market mechanism is preferred to the other depends on the relative values of the uncertainty about the fundamental, and the importance of the liquidity shocks.

Theorem 3 *Define the quantity*

$$c = \frac{\sigma_u^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2}$$

In comparing the expected profits to the institutional investors from trading in an auction or dealer market

(i) *For $n = 2$ a necessary and sufficient condition for auction markets to yield highest expected profits is*

$$0 < c < 0.36$$

(ii) *For $n = 2$ a necessary and sufficient condition for dealer markets to yield highest expected profits is*

$$0.36 < c < 1$$

(iii) *For $n > 2$ condition (ii) applies with sufficiency only*

(iv) *A sufficient condition for auction markets to yield highest expected profits is*

$$0 < c < \frac{\sqrt{1+n}-1}{n}$$

Proof.

For $n = 2$ comparing (11) with (27) shows that profits will be greater in the dealer market as

$$-\left[\varphi \sigma_u^2 - \frac{(\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - \sigma_v^2)(\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)^2}{\varphi^3 \sigma_u^2 (\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + 2\sigma_v^2)} \right] < -\frac{\sigma_v^2}{2\varphi} - \frac{\varphi \sigma_u^2 \sigma_v^2}{2(\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2)}$$

This condition simplifies to

$$\varphi^4 \sigma_u^4 - 2\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 \sigma_v^2 - 2\sigma_v^4 > 0$$

Rearranging and solving this inequality for c , dealer markets are preferred as $c > 0.36$. This establishes the one side of (i). Recall from the parameter

solutions in (9) and (23) that for equilibrium we require that $\sigma_v^2 < \varphi^2 \sigma_u^2$ i.e. that $\frac{\sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2} = c < 1$, which establishes the other side of (i).||

In the range $0.36 < c < 1$ the dealer market will be preferred by these institutional traders. Therefore in the range $0 < c < 0.36$ the auction market will yield the highest expected profits to the traders. This establishes (ii).||

To prove iii), define the difference in profits between the two trading systems as a function of n

$$\pi^d(n) = nE\pi_i^{auction} - \sum_{i=1}^n E[\pi_i^{dealer}] \quad n \geq 2$$

Define also the increment to $\pi^d(n)$ as n increases by one as a function of n

$$\Delta\pi^d(n) = \pi^d(n) - \pi^d(n-1) \quad n \geq 2$$

"Differencing" (11) and (27) and subtracting the latter "difference" from the former gives incremental profit differences as

$$\Delta\pi^d(n) = -(n-1)\sigma_v^4 \frac{n\sigma_v^4 + 2\varphi^2\sigma_v^2\sigma_u^2 - \varphi^4\sigma_u^4}{2\varphi^3\sigma_u^2[(n-1)\sigma_v^2 + \varphi^2\sigma_u^2][n\sigma_v^2 + \varphi^2\sigma_u^2]} \quad n \geq 2$$

Clearly $\Delta\pi^d(n) < 0$ if the numerator in the fraction is positive. Dividing this term by the positive quantity $\varphi^4\sigma_u^4$ gives the expression

$$nc^2 + 2c - 1$$

which can be factorised as

$$nc^2 + 2c - 1 = n(c + \frac{\sqrt{1+n}+1}{n})(c - \frac{\sqrt{1+n}-1}{n})$$

Hence $\Delta\pi^d(n) < 0$ iff $c > \frac{\sqrt{1+n}-1}{n}$. For $n \geq 2$ this condition is always satisfied if (ii) holds so (ii) is sufficient to ensure $\Delta\pi^d(n) < 0$. Noting that

$$\pi^d(n) \equiv \pi^d(2) + \sum_{j=3}^n \Delta\pi^d(j) \quad (28)$$

we see that if (ii) is satisfied, all terms on the right hand side of (28) are negative which proves (iii). ||

To prove (iv) note that for $n \geq 2$, $\Delta\pi^d(n) > 0$ iff $c < \frac{\sqrt{1+n}-1}{n}$. This condition ensures the inequality in (i) holds. Hence, if $c < \frac{\sqrt{1+n}-1}{n}$ all terms on the right of (28) are positive which proves (iv). \square

It was established above that in the call auction, expected profits to the institutions are boosted by the presence of competition between traders but diminished by the inability of trades to reveal information sequentially whereas the opposite is true in the dealer market. In Theorem 1, c measures the ratio of information volatility to that of (normalised) noise trade volatility. Hence when c is high, asymmetric information is prevalent whereas if c is low, liquidity effects are prevalent. The fact that when c is high dealer markets yield higher profits shows that the size of the information revelation effect is more sensitive to the degree of inside information than is the competition effect. In other words, in markets where inside information has a relatively large influence on stock price movements the value of sequential trading in revealing information to the market and so reducing financial institutions' trading costs is high. In markets where liquidity trading is the predominant source of stock price volatility then the value of competitive bidding in reducing financial institutions' trading costs is high.

4 Sensitivity analyses: The effect of perfectly correlated liquidity shocks and collusion.

4.1 Perfectly correlated liquidity shocks

In the analysis above, our institutions were perceived as insurance companies in a segmented market where firm i offers insurance against idiosyncratic risk u_i . It may be however, that these insurance companies pool their risk in a secondary insurance market so that the only risk encountered is systematic risk. This assumption is the polar opposite of the one used in above because instead of liquidity shocks being uncorrelated, they would become perfectly correlated i.e. identical. The analysis is much more simple under this assumption and we suppress derivations here to give just the main results. The institutions' profits under the auction and dealership markets are now respectively

$$E(\pi)^{Auction} = -\frac{\sigma_v^2(\sigma_v^2 + n^2\sigma_u^2\varphi^2)}{2n\varphi(\sigma_v^2 + \varphi^2\sigma_u^2)} \quad (29)$$

and

$$E(\pi)^{Dealer} = -\frac{\sigma_v^2}{2\varphi} \quad (30)$$

The difference between the profits from the two market systems is

$$E(\pi)^{Auction} - E(\pi)^{Dealer} = \frac{(n-1)\sigma_v^2(c-n)}{2n\varphi(c+1)} < 0 \quad (31)$$

Equation (31) shows that in the case of identical liquidity shocks, the dealership always yields higher profits. The intuition is that the sequential revelation of information has now become very powerful because the market maker will be able to infer the value of v *exactly* after only two trades. Hence, expected profits to all except the first institutional trader in the dealership are zero. No amount of competition between traders in the call auction, where only the single observation of aggregate trading volume is available to the market maker, can generate such high profits.

4.2 Collusion

In all of the above we have assumed the absence of collusion amongst the n oligopolists of the call auction. The Appendix shows that were collusion to occur profits would be lower because the market maker would respond by setting a higher mark up (λ) and so increase the costs of trading. However suppose the market maker did not know whether or not traders were colluding but that the mark up is announced by the market maker prior to trading as being either "high" (the mark up under collusion) or "low" (the mark up under competition). We could write the payoff matrix to traders and the market maker as follows

	High λ	Low λ
Collude	π_1	π_2
Compete	π_3	π_4

It is easy to show that⁴ $\pi_3 < \pi_1$ and that $\pi_4 < \pi_2$ and hence that collusion is the dominant strategy for traders. Knowing this, the market maker will

⁴To prove this, take prices as $p = \bar{v} + \lambda X$ for an unspecified value of λ . Then maximise profits as a multiplant monopolist and non-collusive oligopolist taking λ as fixed and known. Taking expectations gives $E\pi_m(\lambda)$ and $E\pi(\lambda)$ respectively for the two profit terms, both of course being functions of λ . Differentiate $E\pi_m(\lambda) - E\pi(\lambda)$ with respect

set a high mark up as this is the "fair" price under collusion. This shows that collusion is the only (Cournot-Nash) equilibrium to this game. There may be circumstances in the markets where collusion is feasible and hence it would be interesting to compare institutional profits in the call auction under collusion with the sequential dealership. We may write profits under the latter as

$$E(\pi)^{Dealer} = -\left[\frac{\sigma_v^2}{2\phi}\right]\left[\frac{\phi^2\sigma_u^2}{\phi^2\sigma_u^2 + \sigma_v^2} + \frac{\phi^2\sigma_u^2}{\phi^2\sigma_u^2 + 2\sigma_v^2} + \dots \frac{\phi^2\sigma_u^2}{\phi^2\sigma_u^2 + n\sigma_v^2}\right] \quad (32)$$

The second term in square braces is clearly less than n so that dealership profits are less than $-n\left[\frac{\sigma_v^2}{2\phi}\right]$ which is as we show in the Appendix, the profits under collusion in the call auction. If collusion is possible in the call auction, therefore, the dealership market always yields higher expected profits to institutional traders.

5 An interpretation of c in terms of excess stock price volatility.

The analysis above shows that the relative profitability of auction and dealer markets hinges on the numerical value of the parameter c , the ratio of fundamentals volatility to (normalised) liquidity trade volatility and on n , the number of firms. In this section we show how these parameters are directly (inversely) related to excess stock price volatility.

If there were no microstructure effects in our model, prices would always and everywhere be equal to v and their variance would be σ_v^2 . The existence of liquidity shocks and asymmetric information causes prices to deviate from v so that stock prices are "excessively" volatile. Empirical papers by Hasbrouk(1993), Snell and Tonks(1998) and others have developed empirical measures of microstructure excess volatility so it would be useful to interpret the conditions given in Theorem 1 in terms of the degree of excess volatility in the market. A natural measure of excess volatility would be $var(p-v)/\sigma_v^2$. The numerator of this measure has been computed by Hasbrouk (1993), De

to λ . The result is easily shown to be positive for all λ . Now $E\pi_m(0) - E\pi(0)$ is $\frac{a(n-1)}{2\phi}$ which is always positive. Hence profits are higher under collusion at $\lambda = 0$ and become more so for higher values of λ . Further details are available on request.

Jong, Nijman and and Roell (1996) and Snell and Tonks (1998) for the NYSE, the Paris Bourse and the London Stocks Exchange respectively. Estimates of the denominator σ_v^2 is also available from these studies.

Starting with the dealership market, the analysis of the previous section can be used to write the price for the j th trade as

$$p_j\{=\bar{v}_{j-1} + \lambda_j x_j\} = p_{j-1} + \lambda_j \beta_j (v - p_{j-1}) + \lambda_j \beta_j \varphi u_j \quad (33)$$

which may be re-written as

$$(p_j - v) = (1 - \lambda_j \beta_j)(p_{j-1} - v) + \lambda_j \beta_j \varphi u_j \quad (34)$$

Using the definitions in (23), (25) and (26) equation (34) becomes

$$(p_j - v) = \left(\frac{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + (j-1)\sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + j\sigma_v^2} \right) (p_{j-1} - v) + \left(\frac{\sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + j\sigma_v^2} \right) \varphi u_j \quad (35)$$

Solving (35) for $j=2,3,\dots$ using the initial condition for $p_1 - v$ implicit in (13) gives

$$(p_j - v) = \frac{-\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + j\sigma_v^2} (v - \bar{v}) + \frac{\varphi \sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + j\sigma_v^2} \sum_{i=1}^j u_i \quad (36)$$

Taking the unconditional variance of both sides of (36) and using the definition of c gives

$$\text{var}(p_j - v) = \frac{\sigma_v^2}{1 + jc} \quad (37)$$

Dividing (37) by σ_v^2 gives our (normalised) measure of excess volatility as

$$\frac{\text{var}(p_j - v)}{\sigma_v^2} = \frac{1}{1 + jc} \quad (38)$$

Repeating the same calculations for an n firm oligopoly call auction gives

$$(p_n - v) = \frac{-\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + n\sigma_v^2} (v - \bar{v}) + \frac{\varphi \sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + n\sigma_v^2} \sum_{i=1}^n u_i \quad (39)$$

and hence

$$\frac{\text{var}(p_n - v)}{\sigma_v^2} = \frac{1}{1 + cn} \quad (40)$$

which are identical to the corresponding formulae for the n th dealership market. Equations (38) and (40) show that our model only allows excess volatility to be as high as the volatility of the fundamental itself i.e. that the ratio $\frac{\text{var}(p_n - v)}{\sigma_v^2}$ lies between zero and unity. Nonetheless, these equations give a more concrete interpretation to the parameter c and the conditions on c and n in Theorem 1. In particular, they show that for given n the dealership is more likely to yield higher profits where markets have low excess volatility because lower excess volatility is associated with higher c which increases the chances of condition (ii) in Theorem 1 being satisfied. Finally note that we might associate n with the lifespan of private information (i.e. the time taken for private information to become public) because the greater is the lag between the inception of the private signal and its announcement, the higher will be the number of institutions trading on it.

6 Conclusions

In this paper we have examined two alternative secondary market microstructures: a sequential dealer market and a call auction, where institutional investors trade non-collusively in the underlying security. The main result of this paper has been to identify the conditions under which one market microstructure is preferred to another in terms of the highest expected profits to the institutional investors, or conversely where trading costs are lowest. We established that in the call auction, expected profits to the institutions are boosted by the presence of competition between traders but diminished by the inability of trades to reveal information sequentially whereas the opposite is true in the dealer market.

We have shown that the expected profits to each institutional investor depends on the variance of the fundamental, the variance of the liquidity shocks and the weighting of the liquidity shock in the institutions' objective function. The main insight of this paper has been to demonstrate that there is not a single optimal trading structure. The structure which yields the highest expected profits to the traders depends on parameter values which govern the relative importance of liquidity shocks to information. Specifically when asymmetric information is prevalent the dealer markets yield

higher profits because the size of the information revelation effect is more sensitive to the degree of inside information than is the competition effect. In other words, in markets where inside information has a relatively large influence on stock price movements the value of sequential trading in revealing information to the market and so reducing financial institutions' trading costs is high. In markets where liquidity trading is the predominant source of stock price volatility then the value of competitive bidding in reducing financial institutions' trading costs is high, in which case the auction market is the preferred market microstructure.

We also interpreted our results in terms of the excess volatility of the trading frictions of each market microstructure. We showed that for a given number of trading institutions, the lower is the excess volatility in any market, the more likely it is that that a dealership system in that market would be preferred over a call auction by institutional traders who are subject to liquidity shocks.

7 Appendix

Consider equilibrium for a "multi-plant" monopoly investor, with n liquidity shocks who must choose optimal x_i . We might think of this financial institution as an investment bank with insurance company or pension fund subsidiaries, with each subsidiary suffering a liquidity shock. The trader maximises

$$\pi|v, u = \sum_{i=1}^n \{ [v - p(X)]x_i - \frac{\varphi}{2}(x_i - u_i)^2 \} \quad (A1)$$

To find the optimal trading volume of the i th institutional trader substitute the conjectured price function (3) into the objective function (A1). The reaction function for the i th subsidiary is

$$x_i = \frac{v - \bar{v}}{2\lambda_m + \varphi} + \frac{\varphi u_i}{2\lambda_m + \varphi} - \frac{2\lambda_m(\sum_{j=1}^n x_j - x_i)}{2\lambda_m + \varphi} \quad (A4)$$

and similarly for the second subsidiary, so that the aggregate trading volume is

$$X_m = \frac{n(v - \mu_m)}{2n\lambda_m + \varphi} + \frac{\varphi}{2n\lambda_m + \varphi} \sum_{i=1}^n u_i \quad (A5)$$

so that

$$\beta_m = \frac{n}{2n\lambda_m + \varphi} ; \gamma_m = \frac{\varphi}{2n\lambda_m + \varphi} \quad (\text{A6})$$

As before market makers act competitively and set prices as the conditional expectation of the terminal value of the asset v conditional on the aggregate trading volume X . The implicit value of λ_m is given by

$$\lambda_m = \{cov(v, X)/var(X)\} = \frac{\beta_m \sigma_v^2}{\beta_m^2 \sigma_v^2 + n\gamma_m^2 \sigma_u^2} \quad (\text{A8})$$

Solving for the three unknown coefficients using (A6) and (A8), gives

$$\lambda_m = \frac{\varphi \sigma_v^2}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - n \sigma_v^2} ; \quad \beta_m = n \frac{[\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - n \sigma_v^2]}{\varphi^3 \sigma_u^2 + n \varphi \sigma_v^2} ; \quad \gamma_m = \frac{[\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 - n \sigma_v^2]}{\varphi^2 \sigma_u^2 + n \sigma_v^2} \quad (\text{A9})$$

We can now compare the values of β and λ from (9) with their counterparts β_m and λ_m from (A9).

Proposition 4

$$\lambda < \lambda_m \text{ and } \beta > \beta_m$$

The proposition shows that competition between rival institutional investors means that trading intensity is greater under the non-cooperative oligopoly than under monopoly, and hence the mark-up of prices by the competitive market maker is less under non-cooperative duopoly than under the collusive outcome. Combining these two effects we can examine the overall impact on prices.

Proposition 5 *For a given sequence of realisations of u_i and v*

$$p_m = p$$

The form of the price function in both the collusive and competitive cases depends on the product of λ and β . Proposition A1 shows that the former is higher and the latter lower under collusion and Proposition A2 shows that these two effects cancel to leave price exactly the same under non-cooperative oligopoly as in the multi-plant monopoly.

Note that the comparative static properties from (9) and (A9) are that

$$\frac{d\lambda}{d\sigma_v} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{d\lambda}{d\sigma_u} < 0$$

and

$$\frac{d\beta}{d\sigma_v} < 0 \text{ and } \frac{d\beta}{d\sigma_u} > 0$$

which are exactly the same as in the Kyle model. When σ_u is high there is so much noise in the system that the market maker cannot distinguish whether the insider is trading or not and λ is insensitive to order flow, likewise the informed trader can easily disguise his trades in the liquidity trades and trading intensity is relatively high. When σ_v is high, because the mm knows that the informed trader has strong reasons to trade, there is a large covariance between the value of the asset and the order flow, so that the order flow is relatively informative about the underlying value of the asset and market makers set a high mark-up.

The value of expected profits for the multiplant monopolist $E\pi_m$ is given by substituting the parameter values from (A9) into (A4), the result and (A5) into the objective function (A1) and then taking expectations over v and u_i to give

$$E\pi_m = -\frac{n\sigma_v^2}{2\varphi} \quad (\text{A11})$$

We may compare A11 with the sum of the expected profits of the oligopolistic traders in the call auction given in equation (11). Surprisingly the expected profits of the multiplant monopolist are lower. This is because the market maker knows that in the multiplant monopolist case the trader is deliberately hiding his information through a less intensive trading strategy, and the market maker's response (from Remark 1) is to increase the price mark-up. This results in lower expected profits for the multiplant monopolist.

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