# Regulating for Prosperity

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#### Outline


Preamble: Don't forget the long-run.


Finance matters beyond crises: It shapes growth, poverty, inequality, and economic opportunities.


Regulating for prosperity: There are things we can do, but most countries are not doing them.


#### Don't forget the long-run


A graphical reminder.























### Don't forget the long-run

• Lucas: After raising questions about the impact of government actions on long-run growth, wrote:

"The consequences for human welfare involved in questions such as these are simply staggering."

 Do financial regulations alter the trajectory of longrun growth and prosperity?

# Does finance shape prosperity?

Debate.


Evidence.


#### The debate: Casino view

Financial markets are unproductive casinos, where the rich come to place their bets.

- If they win, we lose.
- If they lose, we still lose.
- > Regulations should protect us from them.

# This view is popular in Hollywood







# It is also popular at regulatory agencies, international institutions, & with academia

#### The casino view:

- The fundamental determinants of prosperity are savings, education, and innovation.
- Finance plays little role in shaping these determinants.
- Finance's bigger role is in shaping fragility.
- Protect the economy from financial crises

### The debate: Bagehot view

"The banker authorizes the entrepreneur in the name of society to innovate." Schumpeter (1912)

#### Bagehot view

Regulations influence the degree to which financial systems:

- Mobilize savings for "immense" works.
- Allocate capital to those with the best entrepreneurial ideas, rather than to those with more wealth & connections.
- Exert sound governance over the use of that capital.
- Provide mechanisms to manage risk.

#### This suggests regulatory reforms can

- Accelerate growth.
  - Ease credit constraints and facilitate entrepreneurship.
  - Enhance resource allocation and innovation.
  - Spur competition.
- Disproportionately help the poor.
  - Loosen link between access to credit and wealth.
  - Increase the dynamism of labor markets.

## Does finance shape prosperity?


Is the Casino view or Bagehot view correct?

#### Cross-country regressions

$$Y = \alpha + \beta F + \gamma_1 X_1 + \gamma_2 X_2 + \dots + \gamma_{n-1} X_{n-1} + \gamma_n X_n + \varepsilon$$

- Y = either economic growth, growth of income inequality, the income of the poor, extreme poverty.
- F = Measure of financial development.
- $X_1 ... X_n$  = control variables, such as the level of GDP per capita, education, inflation, deficits, black market exchange rate premia, openness to trade, revolutions and coups, political assassinations, etc.
- Then, I graph the resultant relationship between Y and F: β
- Over the same period, 1960-2005 data permitting.


## Finance and growth




### Finance and inequality growth

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
Note: This suggests that finance is disproportionately good for lower income households. Not a trickle down story.



#### Finance and the incomes of the poor



#### Finance and extreme poverty



#### Let's do a different test

- Let's conduct a "quasi-natural" experiment
- We will examine a policy change than improved banks in the different states of the United States in different years.
- > Then, we can assess the effect of this "treatment" on outcomes.

#### A little history

- From the 1800s 1995, U.S. states controlled:
  - New banking licenses.
  - Branching.
  - Entry of banks from other states.
- They sold local banking monopolies.
  - States sold banking licenses to banks.
  - States protected those banks from competition.
    - Intrastate protection through branching restrictions.
    - Interstate protection by limiting "foreign bank" entry.

#### A little more history

- This produced LOTS of banks: ≈30,000 banks!
   But, little competition.
- Local monopolies created inefficiencies:
  - Good ol' boys network.
  - Perhaps, restricting opportunities, hurting entrepreneurship, slowing growth, reducing the demand for labor, etc.
- Local monopolies also created:
  - large profits for protected banks and hence
  - a rich constituency for keeping those regulatory protections.

#### The end of history


 What changed? Was it a recognition of the inefficiency of those regulatory protections?

➤ No. People knew, but the bankers thwarted reform.

➤ Technology changed.




### Competition and state growth




$$\log(\text{GSP})_{\text{st}} = \alpha + \beta_1 D^{-10}_{\text{st}} + \beta_2 D^{-9}_{\text{st}} + \dots + \beta_{25} D^{+15}_{\text{st}} + \mathbf{A}_{\text{s}} + \mathbf{B}_{\text{t}} + \varepsilon_{\text{st}}$$


#### The entry of new firms?



#### The exit of old firms?




#### Competition & state inequality



$$\log(\text{Gini})_{\text{st}} = \alpha + \beta_1 D^{\text{-10}}_{\text{st}} + \beta_2 D^{\text{-9}}_{\text{st}} + ... + \beta_{25} D^{\text{+15}}_{\text{st}} + \mathbf{A}_{\text{s}} + \mathbf{B}_{\text{t}} + \varepsilon_{\text{st.}}$$

## Competition and wage growth



This reports the estimates of  $\gamma$  from 19 separate regressions of the following form:

$$Y(i)_{st} = \alpha + \gamma D_{st} + A_s + B_t + \varepsilon_{st}$$

where  $Y(i)_{st}$  is the logarithm of *i*th percentile of income distribution in state *s* and year *t*.

# Does finance shape prosperity? Yes.

## Regulating for prosperity

- A few thoughts on better, worse, and worst approaches.
- (TBTF is a prosperity issue, not just a crisis issue.)

### Regulating for prosperity strategies

#### Better

- Focus on incentives of decision makers to address TBTF and other problems.
- Cautious official involvement.
- Facilitate competition and transparency.

#### Worse (EU and much of the world)

- Don't focus on incentives of decision makers.
- Massive official involvement.
- Don't foster competition and transparency.

#### Worst (US?)

- Don't focus on incentives of decision makers.
- Don't focus on direct regulatory & supervisory oversight.
- Don't foster competition and transparency.

