Administrative contact: Liz Mincin e.c.mincin@lse.ac.uk
Institutional investors
Shareholder activism
Corporate governance
Financial markets
Financial crises
Journal of Finance, 71(6), 2933-2966.
We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects...
It is alleged that activist hedge funds congregate around a common target, with one acting as the "lead" activist and others as peripheral activists...
We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically...
We investigate how business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds’ proxy voting using a comprehensive dataset spanning 2003 to 2011. In...
An important recent theoretical literature argues that the threat of exit can represent an effective form of governance when the blockholder is a...
Mutual funds hold large blocks of shares in many major corporations. Practitioners and regulators alike have been concerned that mutual funds use...
