Administrative contact: Brenda Clarkson-Williams, B.Clarkson-Williams@lse.ac.uk
Corporate Governance
Financial Contracting
We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds that compete for investor flow. Competition for flow affects...
The Review of Economic Studies, 82 (3), 922–962.
Review of Finance, 19 (4), 1383–1414.
We provide a theoretical framework to study blockholder activism by funds who compete for investor flow. In our model, activists are intrinsically...
In many bilateral transactions, the seller fears being underpaid because its outside option is better known to the buyer. We rationalize a variety of...
We propose that an active takeover market provides incentives by offering acquisition opportunities to successful managers. This allows firms to...
We examine whether a bidder can use tender o§er terms to signal post-takeover security benefits. Neither restricted bids nor cash-equity offers allow...
